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ONE COMPANY, TWO WORLDS: THE 
CASE FOR ALASKA NATIVE 
CORPORATIONS 
TRAVIS G. BUCHANAN* 
ABSTRACT 
In light of the recent uproar about participation by Alaska Native 
Corporations in the 8(a) Small Business Development Program, this Note 
examines the criticisms of such participation and identifies these criticisms’ 
shortcomings, which the Note argues result from a narrow understanding of 
ANCs and the 8(a) program. Instead, the Note makes the case for a more 
holistic understanding of ANC participation in the 8(a) program. Thinking of 
ANCs in this broader way provides a more useful framework for analyzing 
and evaluating proposed reforms to the program. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lately, the inclusion of Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) in the 
Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program 
has been subject to heavy criticism.1 These criticisms have resulted both 
in numerous proposals for regulatory change and—perhaps most 
notably—close scrutiny at a recent Senate subcommittee hearing. 
Despite the fervor with which opponents attack ANCs, this Note makes 
the case for ANC participation in the 8(a) program by advocating for a 
better, more comprehensive framework through which to analyze such 
participation. Part II places ANCs in their historical context in terms of 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) and the Small 
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 1. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow Jr., In Alaska, A Promise Unmet, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 30, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter O’Harrow, A Promise Unmet], available at 2010 
WLNR 19420933; Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bethesda Consultant Made Millions with 
Alaska Firm, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2010, at A22 [hereinafter O’Harrow, Bethesda 
Consultant], available at 2010 WLNR 19362803. 
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Business Act. Part III reviews the current debate about ANC 
participation in the 8(a) program. Part IV then uses the recent Senate 
Subcommittee Report as a vehicle to examine the shortcomings in the 
current analysis of such participation. Part V advocates a better vantage 
point for such analysis. Finally, Part VI examines proposed regulations 
in light of this new perspective. 
II. ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS AND THE SMALL BUSINESS 
ACT 
A. The History of ANCs 
The Alaska Native Corporations were established as a result of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.2 The Act was motivated in 
large part by a desire to allow the development and extraction of 
Alaska’s oil reserves without the hassle of legal claims by Alaska’s 
native peoples.3 Under ANCSA, Alaska Natives agreed to extinguish all 
claims based upon any aboriginal rights.4 In return, Alaska Natives 
received $462,500,000 from the U.S. Treasury and $500,000,000 in 
revenue sharing related to the extraction of oil, gas, and minerals.5  As 
Julie Kitka, President of the Alaska Federation of Natives, points out, 
this transaction has provided enormous benefit to the United States: 
The citizens of the United States and the federal government, 
received a bargain: . . . 16 billion barrels of domestic oil, directly 
attributable to the agreements that are made possible by 
ANCSA. The fields of Prudhoe Bay alone have delivered 
several hundred billions of dollars of goods, services and taxes 
 
 2. See James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: 
Delivering on the Promise, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-2 (2007). 
 3. See id. at 12-3 (“ANCSA was driven in large part by the need to resolve 
aboriginal title claims that prevented the development of the North Slope 
oilfields and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline . . . .”); Contracting Preferences for Alaska 
Native Corporations: Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Contracting Oversight 
of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 111th Cong. 112 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Julie Kitka, President, Alaska Fed’n of 
Natives), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:53113.pdf (“The world-class 
discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay, together with the need for clear title in order to 
build a pipeline across Alaska to transport the oil . . . created a sense of urgency 
and a historic opportunity for a settlement of our land claims.”). 
 4. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006). 
 5. Id. § 1605(a). The other element of compensation was land. See id. § 1613. 
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to the federal government.6 
As a general matter, ANCSA functions by dividing Alaska into 
twelve separate regions.7 The regions were chosen so as to group Alaska 
Natives who “hav[e] a common heritage and shar[e] common 
interests.”8 Alaska Natives—defined as those who are “one-fourth 
degree or more Alaska Indian . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or 
combination thereof”9—were then enrolled in their respective regions 
based upon where they lived.10 ANCSA required each region and 
eligible village to create a corporation.11 Each Alaska Native became a 
shareholder in the regional corporation and in any village corporation of 
which he or she was a member.12 ANCSA also provided forty million 
acres of land in fee simple to the corporations.13 These corporations 
(ANCs) would then serve as vehicles for providing the maximum 
economic, social, and cultural benefit for Alaska Natives.14 
ANCSA was unique in that it sought to settle aboriginal claims to 
the land and yet to do so in a way that did not depend on a reservation 
system.15 Alaska Natives were now, however, thrust into a situation for 
which many were not readily adapted. As Melissa Campbell noted in 
the Alaska Journal of Commerce: 
 
6. Hearing, supra note 3, at 112 (statement of Kitka). 
 7. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (2006). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. § 1602(b). 
 10. Id. § 1604(b). Thus, a single ANC can often encompass many different 
tribal heritages. 
 11. Id. §§ 1606(d), 1607(a). The twelve Regional Corporations are: Ahtna, 
Inc.; The Aleut Corporation; Arctic Slope Regional Corporation; Bering Straits 
Native Corporation; Bristol Bay Native Corporation; Calista Corporation; 
Chugach Alaska Corporation; Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI); Doyon, Ltd.; 
Koniag, Inc.; NANA Regional Corporation; and Sealaska Corporation. See 
ANCSA REG’L ASS’N, ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 2006 ECONOMIC DATA 15–27 
(2008), available at  http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/publications/8(a)/e-
book%20layout/C/C.5/1.%202006%20Economic%20Data,%20ANCSA2008.pdf. 
ANCSA also provided for the creation of the 13th Regional Corporation for 
Alaska Natives who had moved away from Alaska. See id. § 1606(c). 
 12. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(A) (providing shares in Regional Corporations); see 
also id. § 1607 (requiring residents of Native Villages to organize Village 
Corporations). 
 13. See id. § 1610 (withdrawing lands for selection); id. § 1611 (selecting 
lands); id. § 1613 (conveying lands); see also Linxwiler, supra note 2, at 12-24. 
 14. See Linxwiler, supra note 2, at 12-45. 
 15. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b); see also James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act: The First Twenty Years, 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-17 
(1992) (“The basic policy of ANCSA is . . . to extinguish aboriginal title and to 
create a new mechanism for managing federal policy for Alaska Natives, 
without creating tribes or a trust relationship that did not already exist . . . .”). 
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A group of people, most of who[m] had survived on a 
subsistence lifestyle in roadless areas, was suddenly immersed 
in the Western-based corporate world, with the mandate of 
providing their shareholders with a for-profit company. They 
were also to provide nonprofit organizations, offering 
shareholders social and cultural services. It was sink or swim.16 
At first, ANCSA did little to help Alaska Natives.17 Instead, any 
improvements in the status of these peoples during the first thirteen 
years of ANCSA were more attributable to: the “oil-fueled expansion of 
the state economy;” Alaska’s capital spending on housing, education, 
and health facilities; and on improvements to transportation and public 
utilities in rural Alaska.18 The delays and costs that ANCs experienced in 
actually implementing ANCSA initially denied Alaska Natives many of 
the potential benefits of the Act.19 Indeed, several regional corporations 
almost did not survive their first twenty years.20 More than eighty 
percent of the original cash endowment was lost between 1973 and 
1993.21 Combined, the regional corporations averaged only a five 
 
 16. Melissa Campbell, ANC’s 8(a) Status Under Fire, ALASKA J. OF COM., Jan. 
29, 2006, available at http://alaskajournal.com/stories/012906/ 
hom_20060129001.shtml; see also Robert O’Harrow Jr., Answer to Question 19 in 
Two Worlds: Alaska Native Corporations, Discussions/Live Q&A’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 
30, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://live.washingtonpost.com/alaska-
natives.html#question-19 (“There’s no question about the challenges that Alaska 
native communities have faced as they stepped into the Western corporate 
world. They come from a different, equally valid culture, with its own rich 
traditions, not least of which is, as I have come to understand it, to always think 
of the well being of the group, not simply the individual. Capitalism and bottom 
lines was [sic] not at the core of their culture. The best ANCs are working hard 
to meld the two culture [sic].”). 
 17. See, e.g., Linxwiler, supra note 2, at 12-45 (“If ANCSA was an expression 
of America’s idealistic belief in the transformational power of capitalism applied 
to Alaska Natives, then for a large part of the first 25 years of ANCSA the reality 
largely deviated from the hope, because ANCSA’s promise of significant and 
widespread economic achievement largely went unrealized.”). 
 18. INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, BENEFITS OF ALASKA NATIVE 
CORPORATIONS AND THE SBA 8(A) PROGRAM TO ALASKA NATIVES AND ALASKA 8 
(2009), available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/8(a)/ 
Full_Report.pdf. 
 19. Linxwiler, supra note 15, at 2-16. 
 20. INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 7. 
 21. Stephen Colt, Alaska Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Economic Performance 
of the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 155, 155 
(2005). 
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percent return on book equity22 despite the fact that “very substantial” 
natural resource sales took place during that time.23 
In the early 1990s, two noteworthy amendments to ANCSA took 
effect. The first provided that ANCSA’s initial restriction on the 
alienability of Alaska Natives’ stock in their corporations would become 
permanent unless an ANC’s shareholders voted to lift the restriction.24 
Then, in 1992, ANCSA was modified to include a provision that ANCs 
are deemed to be “economically disadvantaged” for all purposes of 
federal law.25 This amendment was made with federal contracting 
programs specifically in mind: 
Section 10 . . . clarif[ies] that Alaska Native corporations are 
minority and economically disadvantaged business enterprises 
for the purposes of implementing SBA [Small Business 
Administration] programs. 
. . . . 
  This section would further clarify that Alaska Native 
corporations and their subsidiary companies are minority and 
economically disadvantaged business enterprises for the 
purposes of qualifying for participation in Federal contracting 
and subcontracting programs, the largest of which include the 
SBA 8(a) program and the Department of Defense Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Program. These programs were 
established to increase the participation of certain segments of 
the population that have historically been denied access to 
 
 22. Id. at 156. The range of return on equity ran from negative fifty percent to 
positive twenty-seven percent. Id. 
 23. The Institute of Social and Economic Research links the differences in 
corporate performance during this period to differences in the regional 
corporations’ relative natural resource endowments. INST. OF SOC. & ECON. 
RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 7. Colt further notes that “only the one-time sale of 
old-growth timber and other natural assets and a one-time tax windfall” allowed 
any regional ANC to report positive income. Colt, supra note 21, at 155–56. 
 24.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-241, § 8, 101 Stat. 1788, 1797–1802 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1626(c) (2006)); see 
also Linxwiler, supra note 2, at 12-16. Some say the plan to make ANC stock 
alienable was part of an agenda to assimilate Alaska Natives and eventually 
regain control of the lands they had received under ANCSA. See, e.g., E. Budd 
Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY, 
July/Aug. 2007. 
 25. Alaska Land Status Technical Corrections Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
415, § 10, 106 Stat. 2112, 2115 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e) (2006)); see also 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION’S 8(A) PROGRAM AND 
ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 8 (2009). 
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Federal procurement opportunities.26 
The provision has been criticized, but it was crucial for Alaska Natives 
because it recognized the distinction between ANCs and the Natives 
they represent. Even if an ANC as a company was economically healthy, 
the Alaska Natives that it provided for remained economically 
disadvantaged. 
B. The Small Business Act and the 8(a) Business Development 
Program 
The Small Business Act in its current form was enacted in 1958 to 
promote the development of small businesses.27 It made the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) permanent in order to enact the policies 
laid out in the Act.28 In 1978, the Act was amended to provide the SBA 
with statutory authority to administer a development program to benefit 
“socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns.”29 
This program is commonly known as the 8(a) program or the Business 
Development program.30 The 8(a) program attempts to help small 
disadvantaged businesses compete in the U.S. economy.31 An important 
but often underappreciated aspect of this program is the fact that it 
represents the intersection of two distinct federal objectives: promoting 
the advancement of small business and promoting the advancement of 
minorities.32 
 
26. S. Rep. No. 102-349, at 14 (1992); see also Hearing, supra note 3, at 72 
(statement of Sarah Lukin, Exec. Dir., Native Am. Contractors Ass’n) 
(“[President Reagan's ‘Commission on Indian Reservation Economies’] found 
that tribally-owned companies had a difficult time qualifying for 8(a) program 
certification. The Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee believed that 
remedial action was necessary to address the low participation of Native 
American and Alaska Native-owned firms in government contracting.”). 
 27. Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958); see also CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., supra note 25, at 2. 
 28. Small Business Act § 4; see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 25, at 2. 
The SBA was created more or less in its current form in 1953, but previous 
incarnations had existed since World War II. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 
25, at 2. 
 29. Act of Oct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, § 201, 92 Stat. 1757, 1760–61 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2006)); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 25, 
at 2–4. This development program itself is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(10) 
(2006). 
 30. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2010). 
 31. Id. 
32. JOHN R. LUCKEY & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40744, THE 
“8(A) PROGRAM” FOR SMALL BUSINESSES OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE SOCIALLY 
AND ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES 1 (2009) 
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To be eligible for the 8(a) program, then, a business must qualify as 
socially and economically disadvantaged and must be small. In 1986, 
Indian tribes—defined as including ANCs—were added to the list of 
groups presumed to be socially disadvantaged.33 Under the amendment 
to ANCSA mentioned above, ANCs are also presumed to be 
economically disadvantaged.34 To be “small” a business cannot be 
“dominant in its field of operation.”35 When determining whether a 
particular ANC business meets the size limitations for the 8(a) program, 
however, the SBA considers the business independently—that is, 
without regard to the ANC parent or to other businesses affiliated with 
the ANC parent.36 This provision does not apply, however, if the SBA 
determines that such a business has or would have a “substantial unfair 
competitive advantage” within an industry.37 Finally, all companies are 
limited to nine years in the 8(a) program.38 
In practice, when a federal government agency needs a particular 
good or service, the SBA will contract with the government agency and 
then arrange for a business in the 8(a) program to perform the contract.39 
The SBA cannot award a contract to a particular 8(a) business, however, 
if doing so would cause the agency to pay more than fair market price.40 
Government agencies are directed to set aside a certain percentage of 
their contracts for 8(a) participants.41 The SBA may award a contract to a 
particular small business in a number of ways: (1) by holding a 
 
(“The current 8(a) Program resulted from the merger of two distinct types of 
federal programs: those seeking to assist small businesses in general and those 
seeking to assist racial and ethnic minorities.”). 
 33. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 25, at 8. This provision is codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2006). See also 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) (2010). 
 34. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e) (2006); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2) (2010). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 632(a) (2006). Therefore, whether a business is small depends 
in part on its industry. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 25, at 6; Table of 
Size Standards, 13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (2010). 
 36. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii) (2010). Size determination is made in this 
way for businesses owned by Native American tribes but not for other 8(a) 
businesses. See id. Logically, it makes sense to allow a tribe, which represents an 
entire community, to have more opportunities to operate a small business than 
an individual has. 
 37. Id. However, the SBA does not routinely make such determinations. See, 
e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-399, INCREASED USE OF ALASKA 
NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED OVERSIGHT 
33 (2006). 
 38. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2 (2010). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 40. Id. § 637(a)(1)(A). 
 41. Id. § 637(d). The percentage is to be no less than twenty-three percent of 
all the total value of all the agency’s contracts. Id. § 644(g)(1). 
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competition among all interested 8(a) businesses; (2) by awarding the 
contract to the small business specifically requested by the contracting 
agency; or (3) by awarding the contract to an 8(a) business that the SBA 
itself selects.42 
A contract must be obtained competitively if: (1) it is reasonably 
expected that there will be fair market price bids from multiple 8(a) 
businesses; (2) the contract price exceeds a certain threshold ($5,500,000 
for manufacturing contracts or $3,500,000 for non-manufacturing 
contracts); and (3) the contract was not accepted by the SBA specifically 
to be awarded to a business owned by a tribe or an ANC.43 Thus, 
contracting agencies can request that a specific non-ANC 8(a) business 
perform a contract only when the value of that contract is less than the 
$5,500,000 or $3,500,000 thresholds; by contrast, contracting agencies can 
request that an ANC business perform a contract of any value. 
III.  THE DEBATE OVER ANC PARTICIPATION IN THE 8(A) 
PROGRAM 
A. RISING SCRUTINY OF ANC PARTICIPATION 
ANCs’ participation in the 8(a) program has recently generated a 
great deal of attention—much of it negative.44 In 2006, Jennifer Yang 
cited “high-profile cases of alleged abuse” and identified contracts in 
defense and security and contracts with large multinational corporations 
as spurring the negative media attention.45 Also in 2006 the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report (GAO Report) detailing its 
 
 42. See Jenny J. Yang, Note, Small Business, Rising Giant: Policies and Costs of 
Section 8(a) Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations, 23 ALASKA L. 
REV. 315, 320–21 (2006). Businesses in the 8(a) program will often lobby for 
agencies to request them on a particular contract. Id. 
 43. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(a) (2010). This third provision in particular has come 
under a great deal of attack. Supporters point out, however, that this treatment 
makes sense in the same way that considering ANCs to be “economically 
disadvantaged” makes sense; that is, ANCs represent hundreds or thousands of 
shareholders rather than a single individual. Hearing, supra note 3, at 73 
(statement of Lukin). 
 44. See, e.g., O’Harrow, A Promise Unmet, supra note 1; Robert Brodsky, Out 
in the Cold, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1, 2009, at 36 (“While their contract awards 
have skyrocketed in recent years, ANCs have taken a beating in terms of public 
opinion.”); Robert O’Harrow Jr., FDA Takes End Run to Award Contract to PR 
Firm, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2008, at A01, available at 2008 WLNR 18674868. 
 45. Yang, supra note 42, at 330–31. 
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investigation into ANC participation in the program. The GAO Report 
concluded that: 
[t]he complex nature of some ANCs’ 8(a) business practices, 
combined with the competing ANCSA and 8(a) program 
goals . . ., create the need for SBA to tailor its regulations and 
policies as well as to provide greater oversight in practice. . . . 
Without this level of oversight, there is clearly the potential for 
unintended consequences or abuse.46 
The GAO Report then recommended ten actions for the SBA to take 
to address concerns about ANCs in the 8(a) program.47 The point has 
also been made, however, that the GAO Report is most notable for what 
it does not contain—i.e., an indictment of ANCs themselves or their 
participation in the 8(a) program.48 
The recent flurry of attention on ANCs would seem to result from 
the combination of the departure from the Senate of the strongest ANC 
supporter, the late Ted Stevens,49 and President Obama’s call to 
eliminate noncompetitive contracts.50 On July 10, 2009, the Inspector 
General of the SBA released a report (hereinafter IG Report) that aimed 
to identify ANC 8(a) contracting trends, determine whether the 8(a) 
program has helped Alaska Natives, and assess the SBA’s ability to 
monitor ANC compliance.51 The IG Report discovered that the SBA had 
implemented only two of the GAO’s ten recommendations in the three 
years since those recommendations were made.52 All the same, the IG 
Report went on to question the role of ANCs in the 8(a) program.53 It 
concluded that the growth of ANC participation in the 8(a) program 
may be limiting the ability of non-ANCs to secure 8(a) contracts.54 The 
Report also questioned whether ANC contracting advantages are the 
most cost-effective way to assist Alaska Natives55 and, perhaps most 
 
 46. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 39; see also Yang, 
supra note 42, at 336 (“The central conclusion of the GAO report, however, is that 
oversight by contracting agencies is unduly lax . . . .”). 
 47. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 40–41. 
 48. Yang, supra note 42, at 355–56. 
 49. Weld Royal, Facing a Loss in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at B12, 
available at 2008 WLNR 20679001. 
 50. Obama Promises To Limit No-Bid Contracts, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2009,  
available at 2009 WLNR 4201787. 
 51. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., PARTICIPATION IN 
THE 8(A) PROGRAM BY FIRMS OWNED BY ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 1 (2009). 
 52. Id. at 6. 
 53. See id. at 22–23. 
 54. Id. at 22. 
 55. Id. at 22–23. 
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importantly, suggested that ANCs are not disadvantaged and that 
including them in the 8(a) program may be inconsistent with the 
program’s goals.56 The Report concluded that Congress may want to 
examine ANC participation in the 8(a) program and further urged that 
the SBA implement the GAO’s recommended actions.57 
B. The Senate Subcommittee Report 
On July 16, 2009, Senator McCaskill chaired a hearing on 
“Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations” before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight.58 The hearing was 
organized because Senator McCaskill wanted to determine whether 
ANCs have “participated in a giant loophole to competitiveness.”59 
Alaska’s senators, however, expressed concern about the hearing. Both 
Democratic Sen. Mark Begich and Republican Sen. Lisa Murkowski 
wrote to McCaskill to express their concerns about her inquiry. 
 
 56. Id. at 23. 
 57. See id. at 23–24. 
 58. See Hearing, supra note 3. The Subcommittee consisted of Claire 
McCaskill (D-Missouri), Susan M. Collins (R-Maine) and Daniel K. Akaka (D-
Hawaii) and was chaired by Senator McCaskill. Id. at III. Witnesses included 
Debra Ritt, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing at the Office of Inspector 
General in the Small Business Administration; Joseph Jordan, Associate 
Administrator for Government Contracting & Business Development at the 
Small Business Administration; Shay Assad, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition & Technology for the Department of Defense; Sarah 
Lukin, Executive Director of the Native American Contractors Association; 
Jacqueline Johnson-Pata, Executive Director of the National Congress of 
American Indians; Julie Kitka, President of the Alaska Federation of Natives; 
Mark Lumer, Senior Vice President of Federal Programs for Cirrus Technology, 
Inc.; and Christina Schneider, CFO of Purcell Construction Corporation. Id. 
 59. Erika Bolstad, Native No-Bid Contracting Sows Tension in US Senate, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 16, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 13627050  
(internal quotation marks omitted). Bolstad reports: 
McCaskill, a former state auditor from Missouri, said she plans to go 
into her subcommittee hearing with an open mind. But she also said 
she's skeptical of the large, no-bid federal contracts that Alaska Native 
corporations are able to obtain. 
In an interview this week, she said she wants to determine whether 
Native corporations have "participated in a giant loophole to 
competitiveness." 
“I will certainly admit I have a bias toward competing for contracts that 
involve public money,” she said. “I'm not ashamed to admit that bias. I 
think it's a healthy bias.” 
Id. 
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“I think we want to make sure we’re not doing it because 
someone ‘feels’ a certain way, but (because) there’s some good 
data that shows the federal government is not spending 
properly or it’s not doing what the mission of what 8(a)s are 
about,” Begich said this week. “I hope it’s not a witch hunt; I 
hope it’s not a specific attack on Alaska Natives in our state.”60 
The day after the hearing, Senator McCaskill’s office issued a 
Majority Staff Analysis entitled “New Information About Contracting 
Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations” (Subcommittee Report).61 
The Subcomittee Report begins with an Executive Summary that 
lists seven bulleted “key findings.”62 After some brief background on the 
history of ANCs, the “preferences” for ANCs, and the information that 
Senator McCaskill had requested from ANCs, the bulk of the Report is 
dedicated to its “Findings,” which are divided into three separate 
sections.63 The first discusses ANCs’ increasing involvement in federal 
contracting from 2000 to 2008.64  The second section begins by asserting 
that ANCs receive a “disproportionate” number of 8(a) contracts; its 
subheadings then make several claims: that ANCs exceed the size 
limitations for small businesses; that ANCs receive large, no-bid 
contracts; and that ANCs use subcontracts to pass large contracts 
through to non-Native companies.65  The third section purports to 
examine the relationship between federal contracts and benefits to 
shareholders.66 In this section, the Report acknowledges the dividends 
and other benefits provided by ANCs but criticizes ANCs for failing to 
employ their shareholders and for paying high salaries to non-Native 
executives.67 Finally, the Report announces its conclusions: 
  In recent years, federal auditors and academics have raised 
concerns that the preferences granted to Alaska Native 
Corporations create the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse in 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, SUBCOMM. ON 
CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, 111TH CONG., NEW INFORMATION ABOUT CONTRACTING 
PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS (PART II) (2009) [hereinafter 
SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II], available at http://mccaskill.senate.gov/pdf/ 
071509/ANC.pdf. 
62. Id. at 2–3. These “key findings” are discussed further infra. 
63. See id. at 1. 
64. Id. at 8–9. 
65. Id. at 9–14. 
66. See id. at 14. 
67. See id. at 14–16. This section also provides two “Case Studies”: one 
focuses on Chenega Corporation and the other focuses on Cook Inlet Region, 
Inc. (CIRI). Id. at 16–17. 
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government contracting. The record before the Subcommittee 
shows that the Alaska Native Corporations are multi-million or 
billion dollar corporations that rank among the largest federal 
contractors. The Subcommittee’s investigation shows that the 
ANCs have taken advantage of their 8(a) contracting 
preferences, receiving large no-bid contracts and passing 
through much of the work to other contractors.  The record also 
shows that ANCs provide some benefits to their shareholders.68 
Such conclusions encapsulate many of the problems that plague the 
Subcommittee Report’s analysis more generally. In brief, note the 
rhetorical ploy in which the Report identifies the potential for waste, 
fraud, and abuse. Note also the assertion that ANCs rank among the 
largest federal contractors, which is an appealing, but hollow, claim: the 
mere fact that ANCs do not look like other 8(a) participants does not 
suggest that the treatment of ANCs is improper. Additionally, note that 
when the Report condemns ANCs for “taking advantage of their 8(a) 
contracting preferences,” it is effectively criticizing ANCs themselves for 
the unique rules designed for ANCs’ unique circumstances. Indeed, the 
Subcommittee singles out ANCs—rather than lax oversight, 
underequipped government contracting agents, or reprehensible non-
Native partners—as the source of abuses in the system. Finally, note the 
comparative short shrift given to the benefits ANCs provide their 
shareholders and to the difficulties associated with living and working 
in Alaska. These and other analytical problems will be discussed in more 
depth in the next Part, which focuses on the shortcomings inherent in 
much of the current debate about ANCs. 
 
C. Recent Calls for Reform 
 
In September and October of 2010, the Washington Post began 
publishing a series of articles by Robert O’Harrow, Jr., which brought 
renewed attention to the debate.69 Part One of the series summarized the 
Post’s findings: many ANCs have federal contracting operations based 
in Washington, D.C.; non-Native executives have received large salaries 
from ANCs; federal oversight has been lax; and most Alaska firms 
“operate in financial obscurity.”70 Another article described how a 
Bethesda-based consultant helped a barely solvent ANC earn 
 
68. Id. at 17. 
69. See, e.g., O’Harrow, A Promise Unmet, supra note 1. 
70. Id.  Many of these points, however, had previously been identified.  See 
Parts III.B and IV infra. 
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$37,000,000 in profit in just a few years and also helped himself to 
$15,000,000 by virtue of his dealings with that ANC.71 A third article 
provided a case study of Eyak Corporation and juxtaposed the poverty 
of its shareholders with the successes of Eyak Corporation’s subsidiary 
and its government-contracting partners.72 Notably, a fourth article 
described the myriad ways in which ANCs provide benefits to their 
shareholders.73 
 Roughly a week after these articles appeared, Senator Claire 
McCaskill (D-Missouri) announced that she would introduce legislation 
that aims to eliminate the rules designed for ANCs.74 In announcing her 
proposed legislation, Senator McCaskill cited the Washington Post series 
and her own “investigations” into ANCs in 2009.75 
IV. THE CURRENT DISCOURSE ON ANCS 
The Subcommittee Report is, of course, a political document rather 
than an objective study, but it provides an instructive lens through 
which to examine the debate about ANC participation in the 8(a) 
program—perhaps precisely because the Report is political. Notably 
starting with the IG Report and continuing with the Subcommittee 
Report and the Washington Post series, the current debate emphasizes 
ANCs as artifacts of the Small Business Act and accordingly focuses on 
ANCs solely as businesses. 
There is an obvious argument though that examining ANC 
participation in the 8(a) program through a Small Business Act-centric 
framework is entirely appropriate because ANCs are participating in a 
Small Business Act program. However, while it may be appropriate to 
begin any examination in the context of the Small Business Act, such a 
beginning does not imply that consideration of ANC participation in the 
 
71. O’Harrow, Bethesda Consultant, supra note 1. 
72. Robert O’Harrow Jr., Behind Lucrative Deals, A Disconnect, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 1, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter O’Harrow, A Disconnect], available at 2010 WLNR 
19529083. However, this analysis suffers from some of the same flaws as does 
the Senate Subcommittee Report discussed infra in Part IV of this Note. 
73. Robert O’Harrow Jr., Despite Questions Over ANCs, Many Pay Out Millions 
In Dividends, Scholarships, Charitable Donations, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/29/AR201
0092907614.html [hereinafter O’Harrow, Despite Questions]. 
74. Press Release, Senator Claire McCaskill, McCaskill To Introduce 
Legislation to Reform Contracting Privileges for Alaska Native Corporations 
(Oct. 8, 2010), available at http://mccaskill.senate.gov/ ?p=press_ 
release&id=1109. Senator McCaskill’s proposed reforms will be discussed infra 
in Part VI of this Note. 
75. See id. 
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8(a) program should end there. This Part will demonstrate how this 
business-centric perspective manifests itself and will also highlight some 
of the problems with such an approach. 
A. ANCs are Big Business 
Analysis of ANC participation in the 8(a) program often condemns 
ANCs for being big. Indeed, the Subcommittee Report’s first two “key 
findings” were that ANCs are “among the largest federal contractors”76 
and that ANCs are “big businesses.”77 However, claiming that ANCs are 
“big” is problematic because it focuses attention on specious arguments 
while failing to address problems in practice. In other words, such 
“findings” matter as far as determining whether or not ANCs look like 
the other participants in the 8(a) program; these findings do not directly 
address practical concerns such as whether the system is being abused, 
whether ANC participation in the 8(a) program benefits Alaska Natives, 
or whether ANC participation is in the best interests of taxpayers. 
In a sense, whether or not ANCs look like other businesses 
encompassed by the Small Business Act is beside the point because 
 
 76. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 2. But, of course, size is relative. 
Labeling ANCs as “among the largest federal contractors” obscures the fact that 
NANA Regional Corporation, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Chugach 
Alaska Corporation, and Afognak Native Corporation were in only the eighty-
fourth, eighty-ninth, ninety-first, and ninety-third positions respectively in a 
ranking of the top recipients of federal contracts in 2008. OMB Watch, Top 100 
Recipients of Federal Contract Awards for FY 2008, FEDSPENDING.ORG, 
http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/tables.php?tabtype=t2&subtype=t&year=2
008 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). The total combined awards for these four ANCs 
represented only 0.48% of total federal contract awards for 2008. See id. Had 
these four ANCs been able to combine their federal contract awards for ranking 
purposes, their combined awards would have placed them jointly at only 
twenty-sixth on the list. See id. Moreover, in 2007, Chugach Alaska Corporation 
was the only ANC to rank in the top one hundred—in the eighty-eighth 
position. OMB Watch, Top 100 Recipients of Federal Contract Awards for FY 2007, 
FEDSPENDING.ORG, http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/tables.php?tabtype 
=t2&subtype=t&year=2007 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). That year, the total 8(a) 
awards to all Native Enterprises would have represented only 0.7% of federal 
contract awards. Hearing, supra note 3, at 75 (statement of Lukin). Although 2009 
statistics are incomplete, Chugach (in the seventy-fifth position) was again the 
only ANC in the top one hundred through part of the third quarter. OMB 
Watch, Top 100 Recipients of Federal Contract Awards for FY 2009, 
FEDSPENDING.ORG, http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/ tables.php?tabtype= 
t2&subtype=t&year=2009 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
77. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 2. Additionally, the third and 
fourth “key findings” also indirectly addressed the size of ANCs: ANCs have 
“created multiple 8(a) subsidiaries” and have “been awarded multiple large 
federal contracts on a sole-source basis.” Id. at 2–3. 
BUCHANAN_120310.DOC 12/3/2010 5:42:54 PM 
2010 NATIVE CORPORATION CONTRACTING 311 
ANCs are encompassed by the Small Business Act. Whatever their size, 
ANCs are not external to the Small Business Act; rather, the Act 
specifically embraces ANCs with specially designed rules. Rather than 
object to ANC participation in the 8(a) program because ANCs look 
different, why not understand the 8(a) program as a system that is able 
to embrace the needs of many different-looking types of participants? 
Claiming that ANCs are big is troubling not only because it is 
largely moot but also because making such claims frames the debate in a 
way that is unfavorable to ANCs. Indeed, the Subcommittee Report 
repeatedly considers ANC participation in the 8(a) program not in terms 
of the rules designed for ANCs but in terms of the rules designed for 
other, non-ANC, 8(a) participants.78 For instance, examining ANCs in 
these terms leads to a characterization of ANC rules as “exemptions” 
and “loopholes.”79 As Sarah Lukin, Executive Director of the Native 
American Contractors Association, noted in her testimony before the 
Subcommittee: 
Labeling the Native 8(a) program as “Preferences” is 
inaccurate[] and does not tell the whole story[] and to some 
may have negative connotations. The Native 8(a) program 
represents an important policy determination by Congress to 
recognize the historic obligations of the Congress to Native 
 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 5. For example, note the Subcommittee Report’s description 
of how ANCs “effectively circumvent[] the nine-year graduation and ownership 
requirements.” Id. But also note Sarah Lukin’s testimony: 
Native Enterprises have two key unique 8(a) provisions: 1. The 
competitive thresholds that limit the amount of sole-source contract 
awards do not apply; and 2. Native Enterprises can participate in the 
8(a) program through more than one company as long as they are in a 
different industry. This was the intent of Congress, and it makes sense 
in light of the economic and social disadvantages with which Native 
communities must contend and the numbers [sic] of Native Americans 
in need. The disadvantages suffered by Native Americans encompass 
entire communities and villages, as opposed to individuals who are 
socially or economically disadvantaged. The ability to operate more 
than one company allows Native Enterprises to provide for hundreds 
or thousands of their people. 
 Hearing, supra note 3, at 73 (statement of Lukin). That is, ANCs do not 
“circumvent” anything; rather, they are bound by different rules because of their 
different circumstances. 
 79. See Bolstad, supra note 59; Press Release, Senator Claire McCaskill,  
Contracting Oversight Subcommittee to Examine Exemptions Favoring Alaska 
Native Corporations (July 8, 2009), available at http://mccaskill.senate.gov/ 
?p=press_release&id=95 (“Not only is there little to no competition for these 
large contracts, based on a federal loophole, many of the companies who 
received the contracts do much of their work outside Alaska.”). 
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American tribes, Native Hawaiians and Alaska Natives. . . . So 
it disturbs me when an official press release describes Tribal, 
ANC and NHO participation in 8(a) as a “federal loophole.”80 
In other instances, the way in which the Subcommittee Report 
frames the debate is even more troubling. Perhaps most egregiously, the 
Subcommittee Report presages its discussion of its “Findings” by stating 
that the GAO Report “concluded that the Alaska Native Corporation 
contracting preferences were an ‘open checkbook’ for government 
agencies.”81 But this “open checkbook” language was in fact not part of 
GAO’s “conclusion.”82 Rather, it comes from the opinion of an 
anonymous government contractor whom the GAO quoted in the 
middle of its study under a subheading entitled “Sole-Source 8(a) 
Contracts to ANC Firms Viewed as Expedient.”83 Similarly, the Report 
also begins its Introduction by noting that ANCs are “uniquely eligible 
for federal contracting opportunities.”84 While ANCs are in fact 
“uniquely eligible,” asserting this special treatment without first 
establishing what the rules for ANCs are—and in many instances never 
establishing why the rules for ANCs are the way they are—intimates 
that the treatment of ANCs is unfair. 
B. Costs and Benefits 
A business-centric perspective permeates the Subcommittee’s 
analysis of the relative costs and benefits of ANC participation in the 
8(a) program, and such a perspective leads to an emphasis on business 
concerns (such as company size and revenues) at the expense of benefits 
not commonly associated with businesses. However, ANCs are not 
simply businesses, and viewing them as such underestimates the good 
that ANCs do. 
 
 80. Hearing, supra note 3, at 69–70 (statement of Lukin). 
 81. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II , supra note 61, at 7. 
82. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 39–40. 
83. Id. at 16–17. The GAO study actually reported: 
Agency officials told us that awarding sole-source contracts to 8(a) 
ANC firms is an easy and expedient method of meeting time-sensitive 
requirements. Some examples follow. . . . Another contracting official 
told us that it was the ‘unofficial’ policy in his organization that for 
urgent requirements over the competitive limits for other 8(a) firms, an 
ANC firm is sought out. He described contracting with ANC firms as 
an ‘open checkbook’ since sole-source awards can be made for any 
dollar amount. Id. 
 84. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II , supra note 61, at 4. 
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For example, the Subcommittee Report focuses on establishing the 
economic value that shareholders receive.85 Although the Report then 
also concedes that it received “detailed accounts of various contributions 
to the community, the value of which is not purely monetary,” the 
Report takes note of only two examples.86 Such a focus may make sense 
for ordinary businesses, which generally provide only dividends to their 
shareholders, but it is grossly insufficient when evaluating ANCs, which 
respond to the unique needs of their shareholders in a number of ways: 
Shareholder preferences for benefits differed among 
corporations. For example, one corporation stated that its 
shareholders prioritized protection of their land and the 
subsistence lifestyle. Shareholders of other corporations placed 
a greater value on dividends, scholarships, training, and job 
opportunities. Corporations reported targeting benefits 
towards the needs of their shareholders.87 
The GAO Report cites several specific examples of such targeted 
benefits: 
investing in low-cost Internet service as a tool to reduce the 
isolation of a particularly remote village; issuing death benefits 
in the form of food vouchers because the cultural tradition 
among its shareholders is to host and feed visitors from the 
time of death through burial services; investing in an insurance 
company when other insurance companies were reluctant to 
insure shareholders’ homes; and subsidizing heating oil for 
residents of a small, remote community north of the Arctic 
Circle, absorbing a loss of $2.75–$3.00 per gallon.88 
The GAO Report’s discussion of benefits provides a telling contrast to 
the Subcommittee Report. The GAO Report divides benefits into three 
 
 85. See id. at 14. The Subcommittee concludes that federal contracts 
contribute a value equal to $615 per person per year. Id. 
 86. Id. at 15. The Report cites only two examples, however: “Sealaska 
Corporation has helped secure funding for municipal drinking water 
improvement systems and management of the Hubbard Glacier overflow in 
order to prevent catastrophic flooding on the Situk River. Several corporations 
have funded programs to renew cultural awareness and preserve native 
languages.” Id. Compare the determination that “several corporations have 
funded programs” to the GAO Report’s finding: “[t]wenty-four of the 30 
corporations we interviewed invested in cultural and heritage programs, which 
included museums, culture camps, or native language preservation.” U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 83 (emphases added). 
 87. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 80. 
 88. Id. at 80–81. 
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broad categories: dividends, other direct benefits, and indirect benefits.89 
“Other direct benefits” included: shareholder hiring preferences and job 
opportunities; other employment assistance programs; benefits for elder 
shareholders; scholarships; internships and other youth programs; 
burial assistance; land leasing, gifting, or other use;90 and community 
infrastructure.91 “Indirect benefits” included: support of the subsistence 
lifestyle;92 cultural preservation; establishment and support of affiliated 
foundations or nonprofit organizations; donations to other nonprofit 
organizations; and support to other corporations.93 Examining ANCs 
solely qua businesses—as does the Subcommittee Report—does not 
appreciate such benefits, which do not appear on a financial statement. 
 Furthermore, the Subcommittee Report does not simply gloss over 
noneconomic benefits to shareholders; even when such benefits are 
mentioned, the discussion is done in a way that minimizes their 
rhetorical impact. Notably, in detailing its “key findings,” the 
Subcommittee Report provides seven bulleted points; each bulleted 
point identifies a concern that has been associated with ANCs.94 The 
Subcommittee Report then notes that the surveyed ANCs have also 
“provided cash, scholarships, preservation of cultural heritage, or other 
benefits valued at approximately $720.1 million over the last nine 
years.”95 Whereas each concern about ANCs gets its own individual 
 
 89. Id. at 81. 
 90. Id. at 82–83. One ANC gifted five acres to any shareholder who requested 
it. Id. at 83. 
 91. Id. at 82–83. In regards to community infrastructure specifically, the GAO 
Report notes that “after the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs 
ceased barge service to its remote village, one corporation established a 
transportation company that became the only mechanism to bring goods to the 
community. Other projects included remodeling the community 
washateria . . . .” Id. at 83. “A washateria is a community laundry and shower 
facility found in villages without running water.” Id. at 83 n.5. 
 92. Id. at 83 (“One corporation built in subsistence leave into its personnel 
policy. Another corporation leased its land for ‘fish camps,’ or plots along a river 
for shareholders to catch and smoke fish in the summertime.”). 
 93. Id. at 83–84. 
 94. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 2–3. In addition to the “key 
findings” identified in notes 62 and 63 supra, the Subcommittee also determined 
that ANCs “may be passing work through to subcontractors,” “employ a 
relatively small percentage of shareholders” and “have relied heavily on highly-
paid, non-Native executives.” Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. The Subcommittee is unfortunately less transparent than one might 
hope in disclosing how it arrived at this figure. The $720,100,000 figure is what 
the Subcommittee “estimates” after an “extensive analysis.” Id. at 14. 
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bullet, the benefits are lumped in a single, non-bulleted sentence.96 The 
effect is that a single benefit is balanced against a range of costs. 
But a cost/benefit analysis that is company-oriented and focuses on 
ANCs only as businesses tends to lead to such an unbalanced 
arrangement. While it is easy to see what something like providing 
scholarships costs an ANC, it is difficult to evaluate what those 
scholarships are worth to an Alaska Native community. Tuition is easy 
to measure, but increased capacity is not. Moreover, since economic 
costs are both more obvious and more quantifiable than social benefits, 
cost/benefit analyses that think of ANCs purely as businesses 
commonly recognize even potential costs in the economic context while 
at the same time overlooking actual gains in the social context.97 For 
instance, the Subcommittee Report notes that the current treatment of 
ANCs creates the potential for fraud.98 But the Report fails to 
acknowledge that current treatment of ANCs has been linked to actual 
benefits: 
During the 1990s improvements appeared in social and 
economic indicators for American Indians and Alaska Natives 
residing in the Alaska Native regions. Interestingly, the 
strength of some of these improvements correlates with the 
regions most active in the 8(a) program. . . . [P]reliminary 
analysis associates higher volumes of Section 8(a) contracting 
with educational and economic improvement.99 
 
 96. See id. While such treatment is unfortunate, it is not uncommon. See 
Yang, supra note 42, at 344–52 (balancing all benefits in “Impact on Alaska 
Natives” against individualized costs in “But Not Enough Jobs and Dividends,” 
“Padding the Taxpayer Bill,” and “Excluding Other Small Businesses and 8(a) 
Programs”). 
 97. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II , supra note 61, at 8 (“Although ANCs provide 
some benefits to their shareholders, ANCs’ contracting preferences also create the 
potential for waste, fraud, and abuse.”) (emphases added). 
 98. Id. at 17. Abuses do occur, of course, but citing instances of abuse does 
not suggest that such abuses are the norm or that ANCs—as opposed to 
underequipped government contracting agents and overbearing non-Native 
partners—are to blame. Indeed, Robert O’Harrow Jr. himself, the author of the 
critical Washington Post series, noted that “the problems with the ANC program 
are similar to problems at the very core of the federal procurement system.” 
Robert O’Harrow Jr., Answer to Question 3 in Two Worlds: Alaska Native 
Corporations, Discussions/Live Q&A’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:09 AM), 
http://live.washingtonpost.com/alaska-natives.html#question-3. 
 99. JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, NATIVE AMERICAN CONTRACTING UNDER SECTION 
8(A) OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL IMPACTS 15–16 
(2007); see also Question 8, Self-Contradictions in Two Worlds: Alaska Native 
Corporations, Discussions/Live Q&A’s, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2010, 9:37 AM), 
http://live.washingtonpost.com/alaska-natives.html#question-8 (“[O’Harrow] 
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In sum, evaluating ANCs from a business-oriented perspective tends to 
overstate the costs associated with their participation in the 8(a) 




Similarly, the Subcommittee Report rails against ANCs’ 
involvement/role in “pass-throughs,” a practice in which an 8(a) 
participant is awarded a contract through the program but then 
subcontracts a large percentage of the work on that contract to a 
company that is ineligible for the 8(a) program.100 However, the Report 
never establishes that pass-throughs are an actual—rather than a 
potential—problem.101 The Report begins by noting that ANCs have the 
ability to subcontract their work.102 The Subcommittee then observes 
that the GAO found “almost no evidence” that agencies were enforcing 
limits on subcontracting.103 What is implied—but is conspicuously left 
unsaid—is any allegation that excessive subcontracting is, in fact, 
occurring. While the Report cites one example as a case study, it never 
suggests that the example is representative.104 Rather, the Subcommittee 
reports that “Alaska Native Corporations may be passing work through 
to subcontractors.”105 As Sarah Lukin notes in a slightly different 
context, the “rhetorical ploy” of saying that excessive subcontracting 
“may” be happening puts the burden on ANCs to prove otherwise.106 
Similarly, Robert O’Harrow’s Washington Post series offers another 
“case study of how Alaska native corporations and their subsidiaries 
have been used to pass on work to large Washington area firms, 
sometimes under circumstances that have been questioned.”107 But the 
fact that ANCs “have been used” to pass work through does not imply 
that such practices are prevalent. Indeed, although the ANC in the 
 
never contrasts native shareholders benefiting from the ANC 8(a) program with 
natives whose ANC does not participate in the program. There is a difference, 
and you can see it in the villages.”). 
 100. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 12–14. 
 101. There is, of course, some documented objectionable conduct by ANCs. 
However, the fact remains that the Subcommittee Report largely bases its 
criticism of pass-throughs on the potential for pass-throughs. 
 102. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 12–13. 
 103. Id. at 13. 
 104. Id. at 13–14. Even this example only reveals that Afognak subcontracted 
more than fifty percent of an 8(a) award a total of fifty-six times over the span of 
nine years. Id. 
105. Id. at 3. 
 106. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 80 (statement of Lukin). 
107. O’Harrow, A Disconnect, supra note 72. 
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O’Harrow article did engage in objectionable subcontracting, the article 
also effectively demonstrates how ANCs—likely more so than other 
firms—are wary “of being accused of being a front for a large 
Company” even when that large partner company is pressuring the 
ANC to subcontract ever-larger portions of the work.108 Such anecdotal 
evidence then would seem to support the claims that have been made 
that the type of pass-throughs to which the Subcommittee Report objects 
are in fact no longer a major cause for concern.109 
Indeed, even in the Post’s series, which was based on “[a] review of 
thousands of records and dozens of interviews with native shareholders, 
ANC executives, government officials and others in Alaska and across 
the nation,”110 the most egregious pass-through did not involve an ANC 
at all.111 Whereas the ANC resisted (albeit unsuccessfully) an 
overbearing partner that was pushing for seventy-five percent of the 
profits, a non-ANC company agreed to pass-through 99.5% of a contract 
to that same partner business.112 According to Mr. O’Harrow, “[t]hat 
company was not an Alaska native firm, but GTSI’s relationship with it 
sheds light on how big firms can use little ones to get at money set aside 
for small businesses.”113 Thus, although ANCs have been subject to a 
heavy dose of criticism, one noteworthy takeaway from Mr. O’Harrow’s 
article is the fact that excessive subcontracting is not a concern that is 
unique to ANCs; it is a problem with the federal procurement system 
itself. 
D. A “Disproportionate” Share of Awards 
The Subcommittee Report begins its discussion of “Alaska Native 
Corporations and the 8(a) Program” by stating that ANCs “now receive 
a disproportionate number of 8(a) contracts.”114 However, the 
Subcommittee Report never clearly identifies what is “disproportionate” 
about the number of awards to ANCs. It alternately notes that ANCs 
receive the majority of their contract dollars through the 8(a) program; 
then it switches to the observation that ANCs received nineteen percent 
of all 8(a) contracts; and finally, it returns to the first point to note that 
 
108. Id. 
 109. See Elizabeth Bluemink, Native Firms Face Changes To Contracting, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 2009, at A4, available at 2009 WLNR 21475492. 
110. O’Harrow, A Promise Unmet, supra note 1. 
111. O’Harrow, A Disconnect, supra note 72. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
 114. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 9. 
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ANCs received sixty-five percent of their contract dollars through the 
8(a) program.115 Thus, the Report seems on the one hand to assert that 
ANCs receive too many 8(a) awards as compared to other 8(a) 
participants, while on the other hand making the point that ANCs 
receive too many 8(a) awards as compared to other types of federal 
contract awards. But such concerns about ANCs’ position in the 
government contracting marketplace appear to be largely unfounded. 
The Subcommittee cites two sources in support of this 
“disproportion.” First, it cites Harry Alford, President of the Black 
Chamber of Commerce, as calling ANCs “a runaway freight train” and 
“predators on the minority business community,” which would seem to 
provide support for the idea that ANCs receive too many 8(a) awards as 
compared to other 8(a) participants.116 Notably, however, Harry Alford 
has been a supporter of ANCs since early 2008.117 Elizabeth Bluemink of 
the Anchorage Daily News describes Alford’s reversal as resulting from 
the realization that business partnerships with ANCs could in fact help 
to provide more opportunities for minority businesses: 
Alford has gone from fierce opponent to potent ally of the 
Native firms. Alford said his main beef with them was that 
black-owned businesses were getting a smaller piece of the 
federal contracting pie. . . . The main thing that changed his 
mind: talking to Arnold Baker, a black New Orleans executive 
who formed a partnership on the Gulf Coast with Eyak 
Technologies, a firm owned by Eyak Corp., the village 
corporation for Native shareholders in Cordova. Baker 
convinced him that the black entrepreneurs could benefit by 
working with the Alaska firms.118 
Thus, it is entirely disingenuous for the Subcommittee Report in 2009 to 
be quoting Harry Alford’s 2006 attack on ANCs. 
Second, the Report cites Jenny Yang for the propositions that ANCs 
take business from other 8(a) participants and that ANCs have become 
 
    115. Id. at 10. 
116. Id.; see also Yang, supra note 42, at 350. 
 117. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bluemink, Black Businesses Mend Fences With Native 
Corporations, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 
WLNR 10230757. 
118. Id.; see also Harry Alford, A Very Rough Week but Victorious, NAT’L BLACK 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, (Feb. 21, 2009), http://www.nationalbcc.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=649:a-very-rough-week-but-
victorious&catid=63:beyond-the-rhetoric&Itemid=8 (“Last year we went to 
Alaska and made friends with various Alaska Native Corporations. A few of 
them have become members of the National Black Chamber of Commerce.”). 
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overly dependent on the 8(a) program.119 Ms. Yang’s conclusions would 
seem to support characterizing ANC awards as “disproportionate” in 
both senses in which the Report uses that word. However, the 
Subcommittee Report again ignores relevant data. In an analysis 
commissioned by Senator Mark Begich of Alaska specifically to brief 
Senator McCaskill’s committee on the benefits of the 8(a) program to 
Alaska Natives, the Institute of Social and Economic Research 
determined that “[t]he 8(a) program appears to be succeeding to 
promote the competitiveness of ANC contractors: while from 2000 to 
2004 ANCs grew their sole-source 8(a) contracting four-fold (GAO), 
their non-8(a) federal contracting business also grew more than five-
fold, and their non-sole-source 8(a) contracts grew more than three-
fold.”120 Thus, while ANCs’ sole-source 8(a) contracts did increase over 
this period, their non-sole-source 8(a) contracts grew at nearly the same 
rate, and their non-8(a) federal government contracts increased at an 
even higher rate than did their sole-source 8(a) contracts. Such statistics 
therefore appear to refute “the possibility that some ANCs, having 
outgrown the sheltered harbor of the 8(a) Program, are nevertheless 
reluctant to wade into the open waters of competitive contracting.”121 
The Subcommittee Report’s assertion that ANCs receive a 
“disproportionate” share of awards resonates in the current debate 
beyond just the arguments of Alford and Yang. One often repeated 
comment observes that in 2008 ANCs received twenty-six percent of all 
8(a) dollars awarded but represented only two percent of the 9500 
businesses in the 8(a) program.122 While the discrepancy in these figures 
 
 119. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 10 (quoting Yang, supra note 42, 
at 343). 
 120. INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 17–18; see also TAYLOR, 
supra note 99, at 8–9  (“Native contracting nearly quadrupled in nominal terms 
from FY 2000 to FY 2005 . . . . Contracting growth was roughly even across forms 
of competition, such that the proportions at the end of the period looked very 
similar to the start; that is to say, competitive contracting grew in proportion to 
uncompetitive contracting.”). Compare this research data to the methodology 
supporting the Subcommittee’s assertion. See Yang, supra note 42, at 341–42. 
121. Yang, supra note 42, at 342. 
 122. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3–4. (opening statement of Senator Susan M. 
Collins); id. at 51 (statement of Debra S. Ritt, Assistant Inspector Gen. for 
Auditing, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 51, 
at 7; Kent Hoover, SBA Limits Large Firms’ Share of 8(a) Deals, WASHINGTON BUS. 
J., Nov. 9, 2009, available at http:// washington.bizjournals.com/extraedge/ 
washingtonbureau/archive/2009/11/09/bureau2.html; Robert Brodsky, IG: 
Alaska native firms winning a disproportionate share of 8(a) contracts, GOV’T 
EXECUTIVE, July 14, 2009, available at http://www.govexec.com/ 
dailyfed/0709/071409rb1.htm. 
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may seem troubling at first glance, one must bear in mind that the 
statistic is comparing 8(a) dollars to 8(a) membership and that different 
rules exist for different types of 8(a) participants. That is, ANCs are not 
subject to the same dollar limitations for sole-source contracts imposed 
upon other 8(a) participants.123 Moreover, as Ron Perry of the Alaska 
8(a) Association has pointed out, such large-scale contracts would likely 
have gone to large federal contractors such as Lockheed Martin.124 The 
IG Report agreed that “[e]ven if these ANC contracts had been awarded 
competitively, rather than on a sole-source basis, it is questionable 
whether other 8(a) firms could have successfully competed for them.”125 
In other words, the discrepancy between the number of ANCs in the 8(a) 
program and the amounts awarded to ANCs is not evidence that ANCs 
take a disproportionate share of contracts from other 8(a) participants; it 
is evidence that the contracts that ANCs do receive are often higher-
price contracts.126 
E. Jobs for Alaska Natives 
The Subcommittee’s analysis of Alaska Native hiring by ANCs 
further demonstrates how thinking about ANCs exclusively in the ways 
that we think about ordinary businesses can be misleading in the bigger 
picture. For instance, the Subcommittee Report looks at what proportion 
of ANC employees are shareholders.127 Again, such an examination 
makes sense if you look at ANCs in the context of the Small Business Act 
because a non-ANC 8(a) business must necessarily employ the person 
 
 123. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.506(a)(1), 124.506(b) (2010). 
 124. Campbell, supra note 16. 
 125. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 51, at 5. The IG Report explains 
that the top ANC participants “had access to the resources of their large parent 
companies, which gave them a competitive advantage over other 8(a) firms. For 
example, the ANC-owned firms had access to capital, lines of credit, bonding 
capability, and administrative resources, as well as the management expertise of 
their parent companies.” Id. Moreover, Sarah Lukin has noted “logic dictates 
that if the ‘powerful advantage’ for ANCs [is] the ability to pursue contracts 
over the $3.5M and $5M caps, their market competitors would in fact be 
everyone but the individually-owned 8(a)’s.” Hearing, supra note 3, at 77 
(statement of Lukin). Indeed, the Subcommittee Report’s claim that ANCs are 
“among the largest federal contractors” would also seem to bear out Lukin’s 
claim. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II , supra note 61, at 2. 
 126. Indeed, Michael Brown—the “‘godfather’ of tribal contracting”—has said 
that the growth in federal work is exactly what he envisioned. Michael Scherer, 
Little Big Companies, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26; see also Hearing, supra 
note 3, at 73 (statement of Lukin). 
 127. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 15. 
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that the business exists to benefit.128 ANCs are unlike other 8(a) 
participants, however, and examining them in this way results in 
misleading statistics. 
The Report frames the questions as: what are the company’s staffing 
needs, and to what extent does the company fill those needs with 
shareholders?129 But such a top-down analysis tends to lose sight of the 
actual people involved. In the letter sent to request information from 
ANCs, Senator McCaskill specifically asked for: “[t]he number of 
employees and the number of employees who are also shareholders.”130 
Such a request—and the analysis based on that request—is misleading 
in the first place because it fails to consider the extent to which Alaska 
Natives are employed by ANCs of which they are not members. Indeed, 
the Subcommittee Report cites the nineteen ANCs it surveyed as 
employing more than 45,000 people.131 The Report also states that 
approximately 2400 employees are shareholders of their employing 
corporation and then concludes that “nearly 95% of ANC employees are 
not ANC shareholders.”132 Such a statement is not strictly true, however, 
because it assumes that an ANC employee who is not a shareholder of 
that particular ANC is also not an Alaska Native. While it may be true 
that nearly ninety-five percent of ANCs’ employees are not shareholders 
of their respective employers, Alaska Natives will often be employed by 
ANCs of which they are not members.133 Measuring ANCs narrowly in 
 
 128. See id. at 15–16. 
 129. See id. at 14–16. 
 130. Letter from Sen. Claire McCaskill, Chairman, Subcomm. on Contracting 
Oversight, to Charles Totemoff, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Chenega 
Corp. (May 12, 2009), available at http://mccaskill.senate.gov/files/documents/ 
pdf/2009-05-12Chenega.pdf. 
 131. Id. at 15. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 11 (“Alaska Native 
hire by the 13 regional and largest village corporations averages 25 percent.”); 
ANCSA REG’L CORP., supra note 11, at 38 (“In 2006 ANCSA Regional 
Corporations employed 30,584 workers worldwide, 14,084 of these were 
employed in Alaska and 3,105 were Alaska Native.”); O’Harrow, Despite 
Questions, supra note 73 (“Sealaska chief executive Chris McNeil said that his 
corporation's commitment to that goal means that 21 percent of employees of 
Sealaska subsidiaries in the SBA 8(a) program are Alaska [N]atives.”); see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 82 (“In addition to offering a 
shareholder hire preference, corporations made efforts to encourage other 
shareholder employment. . . . Some corporations had agreements with partner 
companies encouraging shareholder hire. One corporation had a preference to 
conduct business with shareholder-owned businesses.”). While estimates of 
Alaska Native hiring by ANCs vary, the fact remains that measuring ANCs only 
in terms of shareholder hiring understates the good that ANCs do for Alaska 
Natives by a substantial percentage. 
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this top-down way, as Senator McCaskill and the Subcommittee Report 
do, understates the number of jobs that ANCs provide to Alaska 
Natives. 
Similarly, the Subcommittee Report goes on to note that 
shareholders comprise less than one percent of Afognak Native 
Corporation’s workforce.134 While this analysis also exhibits the same 
flaws as in the example above, it is additionally flawed in that it 
considers the percentage of employees who are also shareholders rather 
than the percentage of shareholders who are also employees. The Report 
notes that Afognak Native Corporation has 728 shareholders and 
employs over 6400 people including fifty-nine shareholders.135 Thinking 
about this situation from the perspective of the company leads to the 
conclusion that the ANC has filled its positions with shareholders less 
than one percent of the time: only fifty-nine of the 6400 people it 
employs are shareholders.136 Thinking in this way, however, loses sight 
of the ANC’s membership; looking at Afognak’s hiring in regards to its 
members, Afognak directly employs fifty-nine out of its 728 members, 
which works out to be more than eight percent of its membership.137 
While there may not seem to be a huge difference between eight percent 
and one percent, consider that changing the measuring stick from total 
employees to ANC members changes the employment percentage by 
879%. While the Subcommittee Report observes that one out of every 
hundred Afognak employees will be a shareholder,138 it is equally true 
that Afognak employs one out of every twelve of its members. 
Additionally, the Subcommittee Report offers similarly misleading 
evaluations in its case studies: Chenega Corporation is reported to 
employ 5356 employees and only fifty-two shareholders;139 CIRI is 
reported to employ shareholders as thirty-five percent of its 
workforce.140 However, the Report again does not consider how much of 
its membership an ANC employs: Chenega has only 170 members so 
while it employs shareholders as only .97% of its workforce—as the 
Report notes—it is no less true that it employs more than thirty percent 
of its members.141 The Report focuses on the fact that one in every 
 
 134. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 15. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 16. 
 140. Id. at 17. 
 141. See id. at 16; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 51, at 8, 
tbl. 1. 
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hundred employees is a shareholder and loses sight of the fact that 
Chenega employs three out every ten of its members. Simply put, 
statements such as those by Senator McCaskill—”[ANCs] employ 
relatively few of their shareholders.”142—are not based on sound 
analysis and do not fare well under a perspective that actually looks at 
the people involved. 
Indeed, the statistics cited by the Report do not demonstrate that 
ANCs employ few shareholders; they demonstrate that the size of an 
ANC’s workforce can often be larger than the size of the ANC’s 
membership. Two conclusions follow from this realization: (1) ANCs are 
held to a different standard (for instance, when an individual owns a 
small business, no one points out that the company’s shareholders 
account for only .2% of its employees) and (2) the Report’s statistics turn 
out to be more of an indictment of the size of ANCs than their hiring 
policies. As noted above, criticisms about the size of an ANC distract 
from the practical issues at hand. Moreover, the size of ANCs makes 
sense in light of the fact that an ANC is responsible for providing 
benefits to more people in more ways than are other types of 8(a) 
participants.143 
Additionally, geography is a substantial factor in hiring ANC 
shareholders, and yet the Subcommittee’s analysis completely fails to 
take it into consideration. For instance, the Report commends CIRI for 
the fact that shareholders make up thirty-five percent of its workforce,144 
but the Report fails to note that CIRI’s region encompasses 
Anchorage,145 which is home to more Alaska Natives than any other 
area: roughly one in every four Alaska Natives lives in the Municipality 
of Anchorage.146 The Subcommittee itself observes that ANCs tend to 
employ a higher percentage of shareholders at their Alaska-based 
corporate offices than they do elsewhere.147 Similarly, CIRI employs a 
relatively high number of Alaska Native shareholders because so many 
 
 142. Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (opening statement of Senator Claire 
McCaskill). 
 143. For more on this point, see Part V.B infra. 
 144. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 17. 
145. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 5, fig. 2. 
 146. J. GREGORY WILLIAMS, ALASKA DEP’T OF LABOR AND WORKFORCE DEV., 
ALASKA POPULATION OVERVIEW: 2009 ESTIMATES 85–86 (2010) available at 
www.labor.state.ak.us/research/pop/chap2.pdf  (“Anchorage had the largest 
number of Native Americans . . . of any borough or census area in 2009 . . . . The 
largest shift in the distribution of the Native American population has occurred 
in the Municipality of Anchorage. . . . By 2009, that proportion had increased to 
24.6%–27.6%.”). 
 147. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 15. 
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of its shareholders live near the Anchorage-based corporate offices. 
Whereas many regional ANCs have their membership diffused across 
remote areas,148 CIRI’s region encompasses the area where the most 
Alaska Natives live. Moreover, examining ANC hiring in this way—that 
is, based on the staffing needs of the ANC—ignores the geographical 
context in yet another way. As the Subcommittee Report and the 
Washington Post series both note, ANCs conduct much of their business 
in the continental U.S.149 But as others have pointed out, ANCs work in 
the lower forty-eight states because that is where the work is.150 Alaska 
Natives, on the other hand, live predominantly in Alaska, and they do 
so for many reasons—including their long-standing ties to the land. 
ANCs exist in large part to preserve those ties to the land. The 
Subcommittee Report takes ANCs to task for performing so much of 
their work outside of Alaska, and yet ANCs work outside of Alaska so 
that Alaska Natives do not have to. ANCs help to provide jobs to those 
 
148. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 24 (“[T]he true population density 
throughout the rest of the state is about one person per two square miles.”). 
 149. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 9 (“The major ANC contractors 
are now large national corporations. . . . Between 2000 and 2008, approximately 
40% of all ANC contract dollars was awarded to ANC subsidiary companies 
located outside of Alaska.”); see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONTRACTING 
OVERSIGHT, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., NEW 
INFORMATION ABOUT CONTRACTING PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA NATIVE 
CORPORATIONS (PART I) 2–3 (2009), available at 
http://mccaskill.senate.gov/files/documents/pdf/ANCdataAnalysis.pdf (“The 
Subcommittee’s investigation has shown that most contracts with Alaska Native 
Corporations are performed outside Alaska. Between 2000 and 2008, only 21% of 
all contract dollars awarded to ANCs ($5 billion) were performed in the state of 
Alaska.”); Hearing, supra note 3, at 76 (statement of Lukin) (“Concern has been 
raised by some that there is a significant presence of ANC employees in 
Virginia, Maryland, and other states.”); O’Harrow, A Promise Unmet, supra note 1 
(“In many cases, the bulk of the money and jobs has gone to nonnative 
executives, managers, employees and traditional federal contractors in the lower 
48 states, a Washington Post examination has found.”). 
 150. TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 20 (“Perhaps some additional economic activity 
at the margin could be moved toward the reservations, but supply and demand 
forces, logistics costs, and geographic synergies create strong incentives for the 
federal government and the Tribal & ANC 8(a) contractors to operate where it is 
efficient to do so . . . .”); Hearing, supra note 3, at 77 (statement of Lukin) (“No 
other 8(a) or small and disadvantaged business, or federal contractor, is 
restricted to working only in its location of headquarters or incorporation. Just 
like all industries, it makes sense that government contractors operate their 
business where, in fact, the government contracts are.”). 
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shareholders who want them, but providing jobs is not their ultimate 
goal.151 
V. A BETTER PERSPECTIVE ON ANC PARTICIPATION IN THE 8(A) 
PROGRAM 
What does a better perspective on ANC participation in the 8(a) 
program look like? As this Note has suggested, a better perspective 
takes a broader view of ANCs in the 8(a) program. Specifically, a better 
view recognizes that the current model of ANC participation is the 
result of complex intermingling of policies and remembers that ANCs 
are communities—not just businesses. 
A. The Policy Web 
Examining ANC participation solely in the context of the Small 
Business Act can lead to a conclusion that ANCs are out of line with the 
8(a) program as a matter of policy. Indeed, SBA officials have observed 
that there is a tension between the objectives of ANCs and the objectives 
of the 8(a) program.152 But is this a valid objection to the current model 
of ANC participation? It suffers from the same infirmities as does the 
criticism that ANCs are big business. That is, objecting that ANCs 
conflict with the policy behind the 8(a) program judges ANCs according 
to the rationales underlying the rules for other 8(a) participants rather 
than the rationales underlying the rules for ANCs.153 Such analysis also 
tends to ignore the extent to which ANC participation in the 8(a) 
program is—in a broader sense—very much in keeping with the policy 
goals of both ANCSA and the 8(a) program. A better understanding of 
ANC participation in the 8(a) program must focus less on whether or 
 
 151. Indeed, part of what ANCs do is protect their shareholders’ ability to 
continue living a subsistence lifestyle. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 37, at 83. 
 152.  Id. at 7–8 (“SBA officials told us that they have faced a challenge in 
overseeing the activity of the 8(a) ANC firms because ANCs’ charter under 
ANCSA is not always consistent with the business development intent of the 
8(a) program. They noted that the goal of ANCs—economic development for 
Alaska Natives from a community standpoint—can be in conflict with the 
primary purpose of the 8(a) program, which is business development for 
individual small, disadvantaged businesses.”). 
 153. The Report notes that “[o]ne rationale for the Alaska Native 
Corporations’ contracting preferences is to further the federal government’s 
policy of supporting small, disadvantaged businesses[,]” but it fails to consider 
the policy behind the treatment of ANCs in any broader context. See SUBCOMM. 
STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 7. 
BUCHANAN_120310.DOC 12/3/2010 5:42:54 PM 
326 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
not ANCs are a “fit” and instead realize that ANCs’ current position in 
the 8(a) program is the result of many overlying policies. Indeed, the 
very fact that ANCs are part of the Small Business Act’s 8(a) program as 
a matter of legislative judgment would seem to be a strong argument in 
favor of an expansive understanding of the policies underlying the 
program. 
1. ANCSA policy. ANC participation in the 8(a) program is 
consistent with ANCSA and with U.S. policy towards Native Americans 
generally. In exchange for Native Americans’ ceding their lands to the 
United States, the government has entered into a trust relationship with 
Native Americans.154 ANCSA is both a product of and an expression of 
this trust relationship.155 One formalist reason that it makes no sense to 
view the policy underlying the 8(a) program as something distinct from 
ANCs themselves is that the 8(a) treatment of ANCs is a part of ANCSA: 
ANCs’ designation as “minority and economically disadvantaged” 
entities is written into ANCSA.156 In other words, the special treatment 
of ANCs in the 8(a) program is thus very much a part of the settlement 
between Alaska Natives and the United States As Julie Kitka notes: “[t]o 
look back now and seek to separate the economic treatment of Alaska 
Natives from the settlement of aboriginal claims would not be just or 
fair.”157 Indeed, after watching the failure of the reservation system, the 
idea behind ANCSA was to create a system that would provide the 
maximum benefit for Alaska Natives.158 The vision of ANCSA has 
always been—at least in part—to allow Alaska Natives to build the 
future they need.159 But when the Subcommittee Report notes that “[o]ne 
of the primary rationales for the ANC contracting preferences is that 
 
 154. Hearing, supra note 3, at 26 (testimony of Jacqueline Johnson-Pata, Exec. 
Dir., Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e) (2006) (conferring minority and economically 
disadvantaged status on ANCs); Hearing, supra note 3, at 113 (statement of Kitka) 
(“The 8(a) treatment of Alaska Natives is part of ANCSA, literally.”). 
 157. Hearing, supra note 3, at 114 (statement of Kitka). 
 158. Linxwiler, supra note 2, at 12-45 (“This business success also signals a 
success, somewhat late in coming, for the original vision for ANCSA—which 
was to create profit-making corporations, instead of tribal governments, as the 
focal point of the resolution of aboriginal claims in Alaska, in hopes that this 
would lead to the maximum benefit for the Alaska Native community.”). 
 159. Linxwiler, supra note 15, at 2-49 (“ANCSA is part of a process. The 
Native Community is synthesizing for itself a complex 20th century culture, 
with elements of tradition and modernity. This is the achievement of one basic 
goal of ANCSA: in the words of ANCSA § 2, ‘a settlement in conformity with 
the real economic and social needs of Natives.’ This synthesis will be 
accomplished by Natives, for Natives.”). 
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they provide economic development and other benefits to the Native 
shareholders and communities,”160 its analysis dissociates the treatment 
of ANCs from the legal framework of ANCSA. Whereas the Report 
grounds the treatment of ANCs in the legal foundation of the Small 
Business Act, it fails to acknowledge that ANCs’ role as providers of 
“economic development and other benefits” to their members is equally 
firmly grounded in statute. Indeed, ANCs were added to the 8(a) 
program precisely because ANCSA provides for ANCs to supply such 
benefits to their members. 
2. 8(a) policy. ANC participation in the 8(a) program is largely 
consistent with the policy goals of the program itself. The stated purpose 
of the 8(a) program is “to assist eligible small disadvantaged business 
concerns compete in the American economy through business 
development.”161 Business development is exactly what the 8(a) 
program is allowing ANCs to do—albeit on a scale that reflects the large 
communities of ANC shareholders. Julie Kitka stated, “With our 
participation in the SBA 8(a) program, our Native corporations become 
integrated in the economy. . . . I view the greatest benefit of our 
participation in the SBA 8(a) program [as being] the capacity building, 
which is occurring and continues.”162 Moreover, the current 8(a) 
program is itself an amalgam of distinct policy interests—namely, a 
desire to benefit minorities and a desire to benefit small business.163 
Therefore, the program itself has already expanded its focus beyond its 
origins as purely small business legislation.164 One must realize that the 
size of the business is only one component in the larger framework of 
the Small Business Act—a framework that is ultimately an attempt to 
provide business development help for those who need it. And as the 
regulations make clear, a participant’s size depends on how size is 
measured; allowing size to be measured in different ways in different 
cases thus effectively allows the 8(a) program to provide help in diverse 
circumstances.165 As Sarah Lukin points out, the Federal Government 
 
 160. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 14. 
 161. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2010). 
 162. Hearing, supra note 3, at 118–19 (statement of Kitka). 
 163. LUCKEY, supra note 32, at 1 (“The current 8(a) Program resulted from the 
merger of two distinct types of federal programs: those seeking to assist small 
businesses in general and those seeking to assist racial and ethnic minorities.”). 
 164. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 4 n.2; see also Hearing, supra 
note 3, at 73 (statement of Lukin). 
 165. Although the 8(a) program is codified as part of the “Small Business 
Act,” the regulations refer to the program as the “Business Development 
Program”—not the “Small Business Development Program.” See 13 C.F.R. § 
124.1 (2010). The title demonstrates that the program’s purpose and substance is 
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itself has argued for an interpretation of the Native 8(a) program as a 
program that is intimately connected to—rather than independent of—
broader policy concerns.166 
B. ANCs are Communities of Alaska Natives 
A better understanding of ANC participation in the 8(a) program 
requires appreciating that ANCs represent many Alaska Natives and 
that Alaska Natives and ANCs themselves both face challenges unlike 
those faced by other 8(a) participants. 
1. Shareholders. ANCs represent many more people than do other 
8(a) participants. On a very basic level, this arrangement means that—
unlike with other 8(a) participants—any contract awarded to an ANC is 
divided among hundreds or thousands of shareholders.167 As an 
example: 
“If an individual has a $5 million contract, all of the benefit 
goes to that person,” said Chris E. McNeil Jr., chief executive 
officer of Sealaska, a regional corporation in southeast Alaska 
with 17,600 shareholders. “That is simply not the case with 
Alaska native corporations and tribes because that benefit is 
diluted down to the tribe or the native corporation.”168 
2. Alaska. ANCs not only represent many more people than other 
8(a) participants, but ANCs and the people that they represent both face 
challenges unlike those faced by other participants. To start with, Alaska 
is both huge and remote.169 Even the Subcommittee Report obliquely 
 
business development; determinations of size and economic disadvantage 
clarify who is eligible for the Business Development Program. 
 166. Hearing, supra note 3, at 70 (statement of Lukin) (quoting AFGE v. United 
States, 195 F. Supp. 2d 4, 36 (D.D.C. 2002)) (“The Native 8(a) program, as the 
federal government has argued in court, ‘furthers the federal policy of Indian 
self-determination, the United States’ trust responsibility, and the promotion of 
economic self-sufficiency among Native American communities.’”). 
 167. Robert Brodsky, Business Is Booming For Alaska Native Corporations, GOV’T 
EXECUTIVE, Mar. 6, 2009, available at http:// www.govexec.com/dailyfed/ 
0309/030609rb1.htm (“Alaskan firms argue that it is unfair to compare them to 
other small businesses that operate under a model designed to benefit individual 
entrepreneurs. ANCs reinvest much of their revenue in the native population 
through their shareholders.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Simpson, supra note 24. As Mr. Simpson eloquently puts it: 
Alaska’s size and far northern location make for unique problems with 
unconventional solutions. Everyone knows Alaska is big. U.S. maps 
usually show it stuck away in a corner and represented in a smaller 
scale than the rest of the country, so it will fit. In Alaska, we believe the 
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recognizes the challenges posed by geography when it declares that 
“[l]ittle information [had] been made available to the public” but notes 
in the same paragraph that statements are available to “members of the 
public who travel to Alaska to access the paper documents.”170 In other 
words, the problem is not that information is unavailable; the problem is 
that it is in Alaska. Moreover, because of this extreme location, Alaska 
Natives live their lives on the leading edge of environmental disaster.171 
For example, one remote Native village has had to relocate entirely 
because of flooding brought on by climate change.172 
Perhaps most importantly, Alaska Natives are extremely poor: 
“The 25.7% poverty rate in Indian Country with similar poverty rates in 
rural Alaska and among Native Hawaiians exceeds that of all other race 
categories, exceeds twice the national average . . . .”173 But even this 
statistic does not fully describe the situation that Alaska Natives face. As 
Jonathan Taylor, a research fellow at The Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development, notes: “because the single national 
poverty standard does not account for the high cost of living in Alaska, 
this Alaska ‘poverty rate’ understates the proportion of individuals 
living with limited purchasing power.”174 Indeed, “in many rural 
villages . . . basic necessities [are] expensive—for example, milk cost $12 
per gallon and fuel cost $5 per gallon.”175 
 
mapmakers are from Texas, which has been peeved ever since Alaska 
became a state and made Texas second largest. Alaskans say, if the 
Texans don’t get over it, we will split our state in two and make Texas 
the third largest. From Ketchikan, the southernmost large town, to 
Attu, the farthest west of the Aleutians, the distance is the same as from 
Miami to San Diego. And Ketchikan to Barrow on the Arctic Ocean 
shore is like that of Miami to Portland, Maine. Alaska’s 670,000 
residents are jammed together in only 600,000 square miles. Half of 
those residents live in and around Anchorage, the largest city, so the 
true population density throughout the rest of the state is about one 
person per two square miles. The western islands of the Aleutian chain 
are beyond the 180th meridian and are therefore the easternmost place 
in the United States. Many Alaska towns and villages are so isolated 
that they are not connected to any road or highway system—including 
the state’s capital at Juneau. Id. 
 170. SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 6. 
 171. See, e.g., Azadeh Ansari, “Climate Change” Forces Eskimos To Abandon 




 173. Hearing, supra note 3, at 71 (statement of Lukin). 
174. TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 6. 
175. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 81. 
BUCHANAN_120310.DOC 12/3/2010 5:42:54 PM 
330 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
In addition to poverty (and sometimes perhaps because of it), 
Alaska Natives also face many other social ills—including 
unemployment (forty percent), inadequate health care, suicide (at a rate 
double the national average), alcohol and drug abuse, diabetes and 
obesity—at extremely elevated rates.176 Historically, Alaska Natives 
have also been discriminated against,177 undereducated,178 and 
undertrained.179 The cumulative effects of all of these problems have 
been building on Native communities for multiple generations.180 
Ironically, the Subcommittee Report181 and the Washington Post182 
both make all of these difficulties manifest when they criticize ANCs for 
hiring non-Native executives and paying them larger salaries than 
Natives in higher-ranked positions received. These critics never stop to 
consider the reasons why such a state of affairs exists at all. After all, 
“it’s counter-intuitive to suggest ANCs would rather have non-Native 
people running their corporations than people from their own 
community.”183 Rather, the more plausible explanation is that 
longstanding social ills have deprived the Alaska Native community of 
qualified candidates and that ANCs must recruit qualified directors. 
Moreover, as Jonathan Taylor notes, one should be careful in criticizing 
 
 176. Hearing, supra note 3, at 71 (statement of Lukin). 
 177. See id. at 117 (statement of Kitka); ANCSA REGIONAL ASS’N, 
TRANSFORMATIONS: ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 2010 ECONOMIC DATA 10 
(2010), available at http://www.ciri.com/content/history/documents/ 
ANCSA_EconomicReport_2010.pdf ("Prior to the passage of ANCSA in 1971, 
most Alaska Native people had very limited economic prospects. Jobs were 
scarce, educational opportunities were limited, health care was often 
inaccessible, public services were sparse, and racial discrimination was 
common."). 
 178. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 15; GRETA L. GOTO ET AL., ALASKA NATIVE 
POLICY CENTER, OUR CHOICES, OUR FUTURE: ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS OF ALASKA 
NATIVES REPORT 2004 84-88 (2004), available at http://www.firstalaskans.org/ 
documents_fai/ANPCa.pdf (describing limited access to education, lower 
achievement, and higher drop-out rates for Alaska Natives). 
 179. See, e.g., GOTO ET AL., supra note 178, at 95 (“A very young Native 
population . . . needs a quality elementary and secondary education, as well as 
vocational training and college, in order to obtain knowledge and skills 
necessary to participate in the modern workforce. Significant economic 
development cannot occur in Alaska, rural or urban, without a well-trained, 
healthy, workforce . . . .”). 
 180. See Hearing, supra note 3, at 73 (statement of Lukin); TAYLOR, supra note 
99, at 15. 
 181. See SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II, supra note 61, at 15–16. 
 182. See, e.g., O’Harrow, A Disconnect, supra note 72. 
183. Letter from Sarah Lukin, Exec. Dir., Native Am. Contractors Ass’n, to 
Robert O’Harrow Jr., Washington Post (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http:// 
www.nativecontractors.org/media/pdf/WashingtonPost_NACAResponse08-
26-10(2).pdf. 
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an ANC’s decision to hire a non-Native because “no one faces the 
incentives as directly or as consequentially as the Native directors that 
have to make the tough call.”184 
3. Unique burdens. In addition to representing large numbers of 
shareholders who face challenges unlike those faced by non-Alaska 
Natives, ANCs as business entities face challenges unlike those faced by 
other 8(a) participants. One way in which ANCs differ from other 8(a) 
participants is that more is required of them generally. “ANCs must also 
fulfill ANCSA obligations that saddle them with expenses of land 
selection, land management, maintenance of shareholder records, and 
annual audits.”185 But at the same time, “ANCs use their profits to fulfill 
a mission that is broader than the bottom line of corporations.”186 ANCs 
do more than simply generate profits for their shareholders.187 ANCs are 
economic engines but also the guardians of their shareholders’ culture 
and heritage.188 And this arrangement is exactly as ANCSA intended it 
to be.189 
 
 184. TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 13. 
185. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 51, at 14. 
186. Id. 
    187. Simpson, supra note 24 (“Unlike other for-profit corporations, the 
ANCSA corporations have assumed obligations to advance the social, cultural, 
and economic welfare of Alaska Natives.”); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., supra note 51, at 14. 
 188. The individual mission statements of many of the various ANCs 
demonstrate that this role is fully as important to ANCs as economic 
stewardship. See ANCSA REG’L CORP., supra note 11, at 17–23 (Arctic Slope 
Regional Corporation (“ASRC’s mission is to actively manage our businesses, 
our lands and resources, our investments, and our relationships to enhance 
Iñupiat cultural and economic freedom—with continuity, responsibility, and 
integrity.”); Bering Straits Native Corporation (“To improve the quality of life of 
our people through economic development while protecting our land, and 
preserving our culture and heritage.”); Bristol Bay Native Corporation 
(“Enriching our Native way of life.”); Chugach Alaska Corporation (“Chugach 
Alaska Corporation is committed to profitability, celebration of our heritage and 
ownership of our lands.”); Cook Inlet Region, Incorporated (“Our mission is to 
promote the economic and social well-being and Alaska Native heritage of our 
shareholders, now and into the future, through prudent stewardship of the 
company’s resources while furthering self-sufficiency among CIRI shareholders 
and their families.”); Doyon, Limited (“To continually enhance our position as a 
financially strong Native corporation in order to promote the economic and 
social well-being of our shareholders and future shareholders, to strengthen our 
Native way of life, and to protect and enhance our land and resources.”)). 
 189. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2006) (“The authority of a Native Corporation to 
provide benefits to its shareholders who are Natives or descendants of Natives 
or to its shareholders' immediate family members who are Natives or 
descendants of Natives to promote the health, education, or welfare of such 
shareholders or family members is expressly authorized and confirmed.”). 
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Additionally, because ANCs are responsible for their shareholders’ 
economic well-being to such a degree, they generally pay a higher 
percentage of any earnings as dividends than would a normal 
corporation190 and will also contribute profits to investments directed at 
making sure dividends continue even if the company has a down 
year.191 As one example, an article in the Washington Post series revealed 
how an ANC managed to make donations to the village corporation’s 
foundations and to fund scholarships despite the fact that that ANC’s 
high-revenue subsidiary was in fact losing money at the time.192 
Finally, an important but often overlooked challenge is the fact that 
ANCs cannot issue stock as needed or even alienate shares freely.  This 
means that their ability to raise capital through normal channels is 
severely limited.193 In short, ANCs often have more burdens placed on 
them than do other companies, and yet they often have fewer resources 
with which to overcome those burdens. 
VI. PROPOSED REFORMS 
Recently, a number of different parties—notably, the SBA,  a group 
of three ANCs, and Senator McCaskill—have proposed reforms to the 
current model of ANC participation in the 8(a) program. This section 
looks at these proposals and attempts to evaluate them in light of the 
more comprehensive perspective discussed previously in Part V. 
 
 190. See INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 9 (“[In 2004] 42 
ANCs paid $117.5 million in dividends from a net profit of $120.3 million, 
meaning that the average dividend payout ratio was 98 percent.”) (citations 
omitted). According to the latest figures, in 2008 sixty-six percent of the profits 
generated by ANCs were issued as dividends. See ANCSA REGIONAL ASS’N., 
supra note 177, at 8. 
 191. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 11–12. 
192. O’Harrow, A Disconnect, supra note 72. Note that Mr. O’Harrow never 
makes this point explicitly, however. See id. Instead, he contrasts the ANC 
subsidiary’s total 2004–2006 revenue of $229 million with the $46,300 worth of 
donations and scholarships provided by the ANC and its subsidiary. See id. 
However, it is misleading to compare high revenues to low payouts without 
acknowledging that the business is losing money. Indeed, despite all of the 
attention on the revenue generated by ANCs, see, e.g., SUBCOMM. STAFF REP. II , 
supra note 61, at 8, it is important to remember that dividends come from 
profit—not revenue, see INST. OF SOC. & ECON. RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 9. And 
as Robert O’Harrow himself acknowledges, the margins on government 
contracting are generally thin. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr., Answer to Question 
20 in Two Worlds: Alaska Native Corporations, Discussions/Live Q&A’s, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 30, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://live.washingtonpost.com/alaska-
natives.html#question-20 (“The pie is not as large as it might appear at first 
glance.”). 
 193. Id. at 12. 
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A. The SBA’s Proposed Reforms 
On October 28, 2009, the SBA proposed a number of changes to its 
regulation of the 8(a) program.194 In whole, these proposals appear to be 
positive changes because they formally limit the potential for abuse of 
the system and yet recognize that ANCs necessarily occupy a unique 
position in the framework of the 8(a) program. 
One proposed rule change would require ANCs and other 
communally owned organizations to provide information 
demonstrating how the 8(a) program benefits its shareholders.195 This 
information would be required as part of the business’s annual 
review.196 Requiring this information will likely be a tremendous 
improvement over the current arrangement precisely because it will 
help to provide a fuller and more contextualized picture of ANC 
participation in the 8(a) program. Such a requirement will also reify the 
less tangible aspects of ANC participation and will preserve that 
broader perspective as part of the record. 
Another regulation proposed by the SBA would prevent an 8(a) 
participant involved in a joint venture from using its status to win a 
sole-source contract and then subcontracting fifty percent of the work to 
its joint partner.197 While such a regulation may at first seem to represent 
an important change, such practices have largely already been 
discontinued.198 Along these same lines, another proposed regulation 
specifies that the 8(a) participant must perform at least forty percent of 
the work done by a joint venture and must later report how this 
requirement was met.199 
The SBA proposed a rule to restrict the ability of tribally-owned 
businesses to cycle subsidiaries through the 8(a) program such that one 
 
 194. See Robert Brodsky, SBA Proposes Major Revisions To Small Business 
Contracting Program, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Oct. 28, 2009, available at http:// 
www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/102809rb1.htm. 
 195. 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status 
Determinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,694, 55,702 (proposed Oct. 28, 2009) (to be 
codified at 13 C.F.R. §§ 121, 124). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 55,705–06. As currently written, regulations would permit an 
arrangement where the ANC and its joint venture partner agree to each perform 
twenty-five percent of a sole-source contract but then subcontract the remaining 
fifty percent to the joint-venture partner. That is, the ANC would perform 
twenty-five percent of the sole-source contract while its joint-partner would 
ultimately perform seventy-five percent of the sole-source contract. Id. 
 198. See Bluemink, supra note 109, at A4. 
 199. 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status 
Determinations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,707. 
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subsidiary simply picks up the work where the previous one left off.200 
While regulations currently prevent subsidiaries from engaging in the 
same primary lines of business, the proposed rule would specify that for 
the first two years after beginning the 8(a) program, a new subsidiary 
cannot receive a contract in a secondary line of business if that 
secondary line of business would overlap with the primary line of 
business of another of the tribe’s subsidiaries.201 Another proposed 
regulation would permit the SBA to graduate an 8(a) participant from 
the program early if that participant outgrows the size limitations for its 
primary line of business.202 
Finally, perhaps the most notable proposal would change the site of 
initial review of ANC applications from the SBA’s Anchorage office to 
its San Francisco office or in some cases to its Philadelphia office.203 The 
SBA suggested this change because the San Francisco office is “better 
suited to receive and review applications from ANC-owned applicants 
because it has more knowledge of SBA’s eligibility requirements, in 
addition to having knowledge of issues specific to ANC-owned 
firms.”204 Such a change would be consistent with the recommendations 
that the GAO Report made in 2006 and reflects the difficulties that the 
SBA—and in particular its Anchorage office—have had in keeping up 
with the volume and complexity of ANC business arrangements.205 This 
change is possibly the single best way to address the problems with 
ANC participation in the 8(a) program; spreading the load more 
equitably will better allow the SBA to monitor ANCs and enforce the 
rules. Such a change is likely also best for ANCs in the long run because 
having more resources available for oversight will help the SBA to 
prevent any inequitable conduct and can help decrease the number and 
intensity of objections to ANCs. 
B. Reforms Proposed by ANCs 
On September 13, 2010, three ANCs—Arctic Slope Regional, CIRI, 
and Doyon—wrote a joint letter to the SBA in which they proposed a 
nine-point “Agenda for Transparency, Accountability and Integrity” to 
 
 200. Id. at 55,701–02. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 55,698. Previously a firm could remain in the 8(a) program and 
continue to perform work in any secondary lines of business that it had not 
outgrown. Id. 
 203. Id. at 55,703. 
 204. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 37, at 7–8. 
 205. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
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reform current regulations.206 According to these ANCs: “[b]y proposing 
changes, we become an important part of the process. Without 
participating in the process, Native 8(a) companies risk losing the right 
to participate in the program. We cannot let that happen.”207 
Most notably, these ANCs stated that they would be in favor of a 
cap of $100,000,000 on 8(a) sole source awards.208 In other words, the 
SBA would be able to award a contract directly to a particular ANC only 
when the value of that contract was less than $100,000,000.209 Contracts 
worth more than that amount could be awarded only via a competition 
among all interested 8(a) participants. 
Other reforms proposed by these ANCs include: tracking and 
reporting benefits to shareholders in a standardized way; prohibiting 
8(a) firms from  taking over contracts from affiliated 8(a) firms on a non-
competitive basis; establishing a “graduated system of remedial 
measures” for 8(a) firms that violate program rules; requiring profits 
generated by joint ventures to be distributed according to the amount of 
work done by each partner and allowing non-competitive awards to 
joint ventures only when the 8(a) firm performs at least forty percent of 
the contract; expanding the “economic disadvantage” designation to 
apply to all Native American Tribe-owned entities and to Native 
Hawaiian Organizations; and requiring consolidated financial 
 
 206. Letter from Rex A. Rock, Sr., President & CEO, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 
Margaret L. Brown, President & CEO, Cook Inlet Region, Inc. & Norman L. 
Phillips, Jr., President & CEO, Doyon, Ltd., to Karen G. Mills, Adm’r, U.S. Small 
Bus. Admin. (Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.asrc.com/_pdf/_press/ 
Reform Package Cover Letter FINAL.pdf. Other Native organizations have 
expressed their disagreement with these reforms. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr., 
Breaking With Tradition, Native Executives Propose Reforms to ANCs, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 1, 2010, at A9, available at 2010 WLNR 19469698 (“[Sarah Lukin, executive 
director of the Native American Contractors Association,] said the three 
reformers, who are not members of her association, ‘can afford to do business’ 
without the set-aside program because of their natural resources and real estate 
holdings.”). 
 207. Rex A. Rock, Margaret L. Brown & Norman L. Phillips, Proposal Will Help 
Native Corporations Grow Into Future, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 21, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 18759281. 
 208. Letter from Rex A. Rock, Sr., et al. to Karen G. Mills, supra note 206. 
 209. Technically, such contracts could still be sole-sourced under the reforms 
proposed by these ANCs but only under the circumstances—such as when there 
is only one qualified contractor or when there is “unusual and compelling 
urgency”—that federal acquisition regulations have otherwise recognized as 
justifying a process other than full and open competition. See ARCTIC SLOPE REG’L 
CORP. ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE 8(A) PROGRAM: THE AGENDA FOR TRANSPARENCY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY 2 (2010), available at http://www.asrc.com/ 
_pdf/_press/Reform Package Agenda for Transparency Accountability and Inte
grity FINAL.pdf; 48 C.F.R. §§ 6.302–03 (2009). 
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statements from affiliated companies.210 Additionally, these ANCs 
support a number of the SBA’s proposed reforms—particularly, to the 
mentor/protégé program.211 
Overall, the proposals of these reformers are largely commendable. 
While the cap on awards is understandably controversial, these ANCs 
can claim to have taken a balanced view of ANC involvement in the 8(a) 
program. The proposals recognize that 8(a) contracting is an important 
tool for ANCs but also that the program could be improved through 
transparency and accountability. Such rules would help ensure not only 
that the system functions as it was designed but also that ANCs, the 
federal government, and taxpayers can all feel comfortable that the 
system is working fairly. 
C. Legislative Reforms Proposed by Senator McCaskill 
Finally, on October 8, 2010, Senator McCaskill announced that she 
would be offering her own reforms—reforms that would effectively 
dismantle the current system of ANC participation in the 8(a) 
program.212 According to the Senator’s press release: 
  U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill is continuing her efforts to 
crack down on waste and abuse in contracting by announcing 
that she will introduce legislation to eliminate the unique 
government contracting preferences and loopholes for Alaska 
Native Corporations (ANCs) . . . . 
  McCaskill, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Contracting 
Oversight, investigated Alaska Native Corporations in 2009 
and found evidence of abuses in a government small business 
program that allows these frequently large organizations to 
receive unlimited, high-value government contracts without 
competition. 
  “We’ve seen that a very small portion of these companies’ 
profits are reaching native Alaskans [sic], so it’s time to 
acknowledge the fact that this program is not effective for 
either native Alaskans [sic] or taxpayers,” McCaskill said.213 
 
 210. ARCTIC SLOPE REG’L CORP. ET AL., supra note 209, at 2–5. 
 211. Id. at 4–6. 
 212. See Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
 213. Id. Note that this press release itself suffers from many of the same 
analytical flaws and rhetorical flourishes that this Note has been discussing. See 
also supra Part III.B. In brief, referring to the rules designed for ANCs as 
“preferences” and “loopholes” is misleading, see supra Part IV.A; describing 
ANCs as “frequently large” organizations is disingenuous and mostly beside the 
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Unfortunately, the senator’s proposals offer more in the way of 
grandstanding than practical solutions; her reforms are troubling in a 
number of ways. 
 In the first place, the senator singles out ANCs in her reforms, and 
yet a number of the provisions that she seeks to change currently apply 
to many other 8(a) participants. For instance, she would prohibit ANCs 
from receiving contracts above a certain threshold ($3,500,000 for 
contracts for services or $5,500,000 for contracts for goods).214 Senator 
McCaskill would also revoke ANCs’ designation as “socially 
disadvantaged” and would “[r]equire ANCs to count all affiliates and 
subsidiaries in size determinations for 8(a) eligibility.”215 These three 
suggestions appear particularly ill-conceived in that none of the rules 
that the senator seeks to change with these three reforms apply 
exclusively to ANCs. Rather, they apply equally to all tribally-owned 
enterprises.216 Yet Senator McCaskill singles out ANCs in each of her 
proposed reforms.217 Such treatment makes one wonder what the 
senator is actually proposing: does Senator McCaskill intend to impose 
these reforms on all Native American business, or does she intend to 
impose these reforms only on ANCs? If the former, then singling out 
ANCs in her press release would beg questions about her motivations in 
proposing these reforms. If the latter, then it would seem problematic 
that she is treating ANCs—who represent some of the neediest people in 
the country—differently from other Native American businesses. 
 Secondly, many of her suggestions do not even appear to respond 
to what the senator claims are the problems with ANC involvement in 
the 8(a) program. For example, Senator McCaskill proposes to revoke 
not only ANCs’ designation as “socially disadvantaged” but also the 
designation as “economically disadvantaged.”218 But such reforms do 
not appear to be responsive—or at least not directly responsive—to the 
problems that the senator purports to have identified in the current 
system. Forcing ANCs to demonstrate their social and economic 
disadvantage before admission to the 8(a) program would not seem 
calculated to curb either “waste” or “abuse.” How does a requirement 
 
point, see supra Part IV.A; finally, stating that a “very small portion” of profits go 
to Alaska Natives is unsubstantiated and simply wrong, see supra text 
accompanying notes 188–90. 
 214. Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. These are the limits that 
apply to non-ANC 8(a) businesses. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(a) (2010). 
 215. Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
 216. See supra Part II.B. 
 217. See Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
 218. Id. 
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that ANCs demonstrate these disadvantages help to prevent 
government contracting agents from overpaying? How would it help to 
prevent disreputable businesses from engaging in excessive 
subcontracting arrangements? Moreover, as this Note has observed, 
ANCs can be economically healthy while the Alaska Natives that it 
provides for remain economically disadvantaged.219 Thus, limiting 8(a) 
participation to economically disadvantaged ANCs would by no means 
ensure that the  needs of economically disadvantaged Alaska Natives are 
being met. Indeed, ANCs were deemed “economically disadvantaged” 
in the first place precisely because the corporations had difficulty 
meeting the 8(a) program’s requirements despite the neediness of their 
members.220 Without the “economic disadvantage” designation for 
ANCs, the 8(a) program did not work as it was meant to. So while these 
particular reforms may at first seem to represent little more than an 
inconvenience for ANCs, as a practical matter they likely mean that 
many ANCs would not be able to qualify for the program at all and that 
accordingly many Alaska Natives would be denied the benefit of ANC 
involvement in the program.221  Indeed, in large part, Senator 
McCaskill’s reforms focus more on form than on function. That is, her 
reforms appear more concerned with appearances than with whether 
the program is accomplishing its objectives. For instance, as mentioned 
above, the senator would require the SBA to take account of all of an 
ANC’s affiliates when making a size determination.222 But again, this 
proposal does not address actual flaws in the system; rather, it appears 
based on the argument that ANCs do not look like other 8(a) 
participants—an argument that itself stems from an unnecessarily 
narrow vision of what the 8(a) program does.223 Additionally, Senator 
McCaskill seems to be more concerned with making grand statements 
than with making improvements to the system when she proposes to 
“[p]rohibit ANCs who chose to participate in the 8(a) program from 
operating as pass-throughs to non-Native companies that do not qualify 
under the 8(a) program.”224 This proposal is particularly unhelpful 
because it offers no vision of what such a prohibition would look like; 
 
 219. See Part II.A supra. 
 220. See Part II.A supra. 
 221. Of course, there is an argument that there would be less waste and abuse 
without ANCs in the 8(a) program. But exiling ANCs would seem to make them 
a scapegoat for the system’s problems. And to this point Senator McCaskill has 
not explicitly called for removing ANCs from the 8(a) program. 
 222. See Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
 223. See Part IV.A supra. 
 224. See Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
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the senator is identifying a problem, not a solution. In contrast, consider 
the SBA’s specific proposals: first, that 8(a) participants be prohibited 
from subcontracting to their joint venture partner and, second, that 8(a) 
participants be required to demonstrate that they performed at least 
forty percent of a contract.225 And the three ANC reformers suggested: 
first, that joint ventures be prohibited from receiving contracts 
noncompetitively unless the 8(a) participant performs at least forty 
percent of the contract and, second, that joint venture profits be divided 
among the partners according to the amount of work done by each 
partner.226 These proposals would not only discourage excessive 
subcontracting but would also address concerns that as a practical 
matter, large joint venture partners are often in a position to apply 
outsized pressure on their 8(a) business partner. Whereas the SBA and 
the three ANCs attempted to address excessive subcontracting seriously, 
Senator McCaskill’s suggestion appears long on political rhetoric and 
short on considered analysis. 
 Finally, Senator McCaskill’s other proposals are also misguided 
because they fail to understand ANCs in the more holistic terms 
suggested by this Note in Part V. According to one proposal, an ANC 
would only be able to own a majority interest in one 8(a) business at a 
time.227 In a second proposal, an ANC 8(a) participant would have to be 
managed by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.228 
But such proposals attempt to make ANCs subject to the rules designed 
for non-ANC businesses. As this Note has demonstrated, there are good 
reasons why the rules are the way they are for ANCs. Reforms such as 
these result from an overly narrow view of the 8(a) program and from a 
failure to appreciate the complex array of policy choices and practical 
realities that are reflected in the current treatment of ANCs. ANCs are 
able to own multiple majority interests because they are made up of 
many, many disadvantaged people. Additionally, ANCs are able to be 
managed by non-Natives because ANCs have responsibilities that go 
beyond providing business development skills to the individual.  While 
the hope is that the 8(a) program will help develop qualified Native 
managers, having the best possible management in place ensures that 
ANCs are best able to meet these larger responsibilities in the here and 
now. 
In short, Senator McCaskill’s proposed reforms appear ill-
 
 225. See text accompanying notes 197–99. 
 226. See text accompanying note 210 supra. 
 227. See Press Release, Claire McCaskill, supra note 74. 
 228. See id. 
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considered at best. Rather than expand her understanding of what the 
8(a) program does, the senator attempts to curtail what the program is 
capable of doing. An 8(a) program recast as the senator suggests would 
be non-responsive to the needs of Alaska Natives and, as a practical 
matter, would likely be unavailable to ANCs in any event.229 From the 
point of view of Alaska Natives, legislation that forces ANCs out of the 
8(a) program would represent an egregious bait-and-switch by the 
federal government. Such legislation would also be inappropriate in that 
it would make ANCs the scapegoat for problems that exist in the federal 
procurement system more generally. The law, as currently written, 
reflects an understanding that ANCs are complex institutions that 
inhabit a complex situation. Yet, Senator McCaskill’s proposals, do not 
acknowledge any such complexity; indeed, they would seem to tend 
more towards antagonism than thoughtfulness. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note makes the case for continued ANC participation in the 
8(a) program by providing a more comprehensive framework for 
analyzing such participation. In one sense, it all comes down to a 
determination of what question we should be asking about ANC 
participation in the 8(a) program. Asking “do ANCs belong in the 8(a) 
program?” often leads to a simple “no” because intuitively ANCs do not 
have much in common with other 8(a) participants. 
But when we think about ANCs more holistically, we ask a broader 
question: “does the treatment of ANCs make sense?” Answering such a 
question requires understanding that the current system of ANC 
involvement in the 8(a) program reflects considered judgments not just 
about the Small Business Act but about ANCSA policy and federal 
Native American policy generally. It requires understanding how the 
current system recognizes the needs of Alaska Natives and makes a 
meaningful difference in their lives. While mindful that the system can 
be improved at its edges, this Note suggests that the answer to this 
second question is “yes.” Answering the second question is 
undoubtedly a more difficult task than answering the first, but 
hopefully, this Note has demonstrated at the least that this second, more 
complicated question is the right one to be asking.  
 
 
 229. See text accompanying notes 218–21 supra. 
